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ABSTRACT 
 
This research examined the legal nature of the presumption of guilt created by section 235(2) of the 
South African Tax Admiration Act and considered whether or not its practical application violates the 
taxpayer’s fundamental right contained in section 35(3) of the Constitution, which gives every 
accused taxpayer the right to a fair trial, including the right to be presumed innocent. The research 
also provided clarity on the constitutionality of this presumption because it has been widely been 
criticised for unjustifiably violating the taxpayer's constitutional right to a fair trial. The conclusion 
reached is that the presumption created by section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act constitutes an 
evidentiary burden rather than a reverse onus. It does not create the possibility of conviction, unlike a 
reverse onus where conviction is possible, despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it 
does not violate the accused taxpayer’s the right to a fair trial and the right to be presumed innocent 
and hence it is constitutional. Accordingly, the chances that the accused taxpayer will succeed in 
challenging the constitutionality of section 235(2) of the Act are slim.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
 
 
1.1 Context  
 
As a point of departure, it is essential to consider the object or purpose of taxation. The main 
purpose of taxation by governments is to collect sufficient funds from the public for the 
proper functioning of the government.1 The imposition of taxes by governments upon their 
citizens is also an imperative to provide the public with the necessary goods and services.2In 
essence, the government needs public funding which is collected in the form of tax to ensure 
an effective running of the state.  
 
According to Croome,3 tax has been imposed in various countries across the world for many 
centuries. In Egypt, during the time of the Pharaohs, the Egyptians paid tax calculated by 
measuring the rise and fall of the Nile River. In the Roman Empire, the burden of taxation did 
not fall on Roman citizens but on those living in the provinces controlled by the Roman 
Empire.4 In South Africa, sections 3 and 4 of the South African Revenue Service Act5 confer 
the power of levying of all taxes on the South African Revenue Service (referred to as 
SARS). The imposition of tax upon natural and juristic persons by the government in South 
Africa is therefore not a new concept but is found in most countries throughout the world.  
 
The taxpayer would usually seek to minimise the tax payable while, at the same time, the 
state seeks to extract the maximum amount possible from its citizens. This has been 
expressed by Coffield,6 when he stated that “the interest of the state is to tax heavily: that of 
the community is to be little taxed”. One of the main aims of SARS is to ensure that all 
income is efficiently and effectively taxed in terms of the Income Tax Act7 (referred to as the 
‘Income Tax Act”). To achieve this end, the court in ITC 11998 stated that the Income Tax 
                                                            
1Muller, E. (2010) A Framework for Wealth Transfer Taxation in South Africa 37. 
2Brautigam, D. A. (2006)."Contingent Consent: Export Taxation and State Building in Mauritius 12. 
3Croome, B.J. (2010) Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa 1. 
4Coffield, J. (1970) A Popular History of Taxation, From Ancient to Modern Times 2. 
5Act 34 of 1997. 
6Coffield, J. (1970) A Popular History of Taxation at 12. 
7Act 58 of 1962. 
8ITC 1199 36 SACT 16 at paragraph 19. 
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Act9 is framed in such a wide way to ensure that the taxpayer cannot avoid tax payment.  
Section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act10 (referred to as the “Tax Administration Act”) 
provides that: 
 
Where a taxpayer or any other person makes a false statement in any books of 
account or other records of any taxpayer, unless the person proves that there is a 
reasonable possibility that he was ignorant of the falsity of the statement and that 
the ignorance was not due to negligence on his part, he shall be regarded as guilty 
of making a false statement with the intention of evading assessment or taxation.  
 
It  is important to note that the laws governing the South African taxation system must not be 
looked at in isolation but must always be viewed within the body of other laws and 
particularly the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,11 (referred to as “The 
Constitution”), which is the supreme law of the land. The Commission of Enquiry into 
Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa12  (referred to as the Katz Commission) 
stated that the tax system is subject to the Constitution and must conform to society’s 
commitment to the Rule of Law. In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v C: SARS,13 
the court emphasized that “no matter how indispensable fiscal statutory provisions are for the 
economic well-being of the country, they are however not immune to the discipline of the 
Constitution.” In addition to this, section 195(1) of the Constitution14 provides that public 
administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the 
Constitution. In this regard, it is a common cause that the Constitution is the supreme law of 
the land; all legislation that governs the taxation system in South Africa must therefore 
conform to the Constitutional rights and its normative standards. 
 
Section 35(3) of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution15 guarantees everyone the right to a fair 
trial which includes the right to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify 
during the proceedings. The presumption of innocence is not only important in South Africa, 
but also in many countries across the world. For example, it is protected by section 11(d) of 
                                                            
9Act 58 of 1962. 
10Act 28 of 2011. 
11The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
12The Commission of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa 73. 
13First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v C: SARS2001 (7) BCLR 715 (C). 
14The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
15The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.16 The presumption of innocence is also 
protected in various international instruments. Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights17 provides that “everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial”. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights18 provides that “everyone charged with a criminal 
offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”. In 
this sense, it is clear that presumption of innocence is one of the core rights afforded to all the 
accused persons (including the accused taxpayer) so as to ensure that the accused persons 
enjoyed their right to a fair trial. 
 
The court in Ferreira v Levin NO and others v Powell NO and Others19 stated that the 
essence of the Constitution is that it is the supreme law the country and that any law or 
conduct which is inconsistent with it is invalid. It was held further by the court that the 
obligations imposed by the Constitution must be fulfilled. This means that the taxpayer’s 
right to a fair trial is protected from irrational limitation. If there is any conduct or law that 
infringes this right, the taxpayer can make an application to the court for an order declaring 
such law to be invalid. However, there are no absolute rights in the Constitution. In other 
words, the law permits a reasonable limitation to every right embodied in the Constitution.  
This sentiment has been expressed in S v Manamela20 in which the Constitutional court21 
stated that the boundaries of all constitutional rights are set by the rights of others and by the 
legitimate needs of the society. In Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd22 Cameron J23 stated 
that, generally, it is recognised that the public order, safety, health and democratic values 
justify the imposition of restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights. In light of this, it is 
apparent that the South African Constitution provides for the limitation of fundamental rights, 
provided that the limitation is justified.  
 
                                                            
16The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11). 
17The Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 
1948. 
18The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
16 December 1966. 
19Ferreira v Levin NO and others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) BCLRI (CC) at paragraph 22. 
20S v Manamela2000 (3) SA 1 (CC). 
21 S v Manamela2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) at paragraph 32.  
22Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W). 
23 Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W) at paragraph 44. 
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For any limitation to a Constitutional right to be justified, it must comply with the general 
limitation clause contained in section 36 of the Constitution. In terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution, the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all 
relevant factors.  The relevant factors include: 
a)    the nature of the right;  
b)    the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
c)    the nature and extent of the limitation;  
d)    the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e)    less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
If the limitation complies with the above provision, the law permits such a limitation. The 
taxpayer must therefore not mistakenly assume that a right to a fair trial afforded by the 
Constitution may not be limited in any way. However, the existence of the general limitation 
clause in the Constitution does not mean that the rights contained in the Bill of Rights can be 
limited for any reason.24 The reason for limiting any constitutional right needs to be 
exceptionally strong.25 In other words, the restriction must serve a purpose that most people 
would regard as convincingly vital.  In S v Manamela26 the court stated that the limitation of a 
right will not be justifiable unless there is a very good reason for thinking that the restriction 
would achieve the purpose it is designed to achieve and that there is no other realistically 
available way in which the purpose can be achieved without restricting constitutionally 
protected rights.  
 
Where the taxpayer is of the opinion that his or her constitutional rights are unreasonably and 
unjustifiably limited by the powers conferred upon the SARS, he or she has the right to 
approach the court for constitutional protection.27 To succeed in seeking constitutional 
protection, the taxpayer must firstly prove that his right has been limited and that such right is 
protected by the Constitution.28 If a taxpayer is able to prove that, the court will then consider 
whether the infringement of that right was justifiable under the limitation clause contained in 
                                                            
24Currie, I. & De Waal, J. (2013).The Bill of Rights Handbook 151. 
25Currie, I. & De Waal, J. (2013).The Bill of Rights Handbook 152. 
26S v Manamela 2000(3) SA 1 (CC) at paragraph 33.  
27Croome, B.J. (2010) Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa 10. 
28Croome, B.J. (2010) Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa 16. 
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section 36 of the Constitution.29 If the infringement amounts to a reasonable and justifiable 
limitation, the impediment will be permitted. In the event that the limitation is not justifiable, 
it will be declared unconstitutional as contemplated in terms of section 172(1) of the 
Constitution, which provides that: 
 
1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court — 
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid 
to the extent of its inconsistency; and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including — 
(i)  an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any 
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect. 
 
1.2 Problem statement  
 
In the Republic of South Africa tax evasion by taxpayers cannot be condoned. To ensure that 
taxpayers do not evade the payment of tax, section 235(2)of the Tax Administration Act30 
provides that, where a taxpayer makes a false statement in any books of account or other 
records of any taxpayer, unless the person proves that there is a reasonable possibility that he 
was ignorant of the falsity of the statement and that the ignorance was not due to negligence 
on his part, he shall be regarded as guilty of making a false statement with the intention of 
evading assessment or taxation. The implication of this provision, according to Van 
Schalkwyk31, is to create a reverse onus of proof which effectively relieves the state from 
proving an essential element of the offence, namely that it was committed with the intention 
to evade assessment of taxation. This raises a question as to whether the practical application 
of section 235(2) of the Act32 unreasonably infringes the accused taxpayer’s constitutional 
right to a fair trial as guaranteed to an accused person in section 35(3) of the Constitution, in 
particular the right, mentioned in s 35(3)(h), ‘to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and 
not to testify during the proceedings’. 
 
 
                                                            
29Croome, B.J. (2010) Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa 16. 
30Act 28 of 2011. 
31Van Schalkwyk, L. (1996). The constitutionality of the reversed onus of proof. Accountancy SA at 25. 
32Act 28 of 2011. 
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1.3 Research goals  
 
The main goal of the research was to examine the legal nature of the presumption created by 
section 235(2) of the Act33 and establish whether its practical application violates the 
taxpayer's constitutional right to a fair trial. If the answer to the above legal question is in the 
affirmative (it violates the taxpayer’s constitutional right to a fair trial), this research intended 
to ascertain whether or not such an infringement is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society. In addressing the goal of the research, a comparative analysis of the 
Canadian, United Kingdom, and American legislation was carried out.  
 
1.4 Purpose of the Research 
 
The purpose of this research is to provide clarity on the constitutionality of the presumption 
created by section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act34 and to shed light on the chances of 
the taxpayer to succeed in challenging the constitutionality of section 235(2) of the Tax 
Administration Act35 if he or she so wishes. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology  
 
An interpretative research approach was adopted for the present research which sought to 
understand and describe.36 The research methodology applied can be described as a doctrinal 
research methodology.37 This methodology provides a systematic exposition of the rules 
governing a particular legal category (in the present case the legal rules relating to the 
presumption created by section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act38 and the taxpayer’s 
right to a fair trial), analyses the relationships between the rules, explains areas of difficulty 
and is based purely on documentary data.39 The documentary data used for the research 
consists of the South African Constitution and tax legislation, case law, journals, textbooks, 
                                                            
33Act 28 of 2011. 
34Act 28 of 2011. 
35Act 28 of 2011. 
36Babbie, E., & Mouton, J. (2009).The practice of social research: South African edition. 
37 McKerchar, M. Philosophical Paradigms, Inquiry Strategies and Knowledge Claims: Applying the Principles 
of Research Design and Conduct to Taxation. E-Journal of Tax Research at 1. 
38Act 28 of 2011. 
39McKerchar, M. Philosophical Paradigms, Inquiry Strategies and Knowledge Claims: Applying the Principles 
of Research Design and Conduct to Taxation. E-Journal of Tax Research at 1.  
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writings of authoritative experts and other legislation such as the Criminal Procedure Act,40 
and the Customs and Excise Act.41 Canadian, United Kingdom, and American legislation was 
also analysed, together with court decisions and expert writings in these jurisdictions. 
 
The research is conducted in the form of an extended argument, supported by documentary 
evidence. The validity and reliability of the research and the conclusions was ensured by: 
 
 adhering to the rules of the statutory interpretation, as established in terms of statute 
and common law; 
 placing greater evidential weight on legislation, case law which creates precedent or 
which is of persuasive value (primary data) and the writings of acknowledged 
experts in the field; 
 discussing opposing viewpoints and concluding, based on a preponderance of 
credible evidence; and 
 the rigour of the arguments. 
 
As all the data was in the public domain, no ethical considerations arose. No interviews were 
conducted; opinions were considered in their written form. 
 
1.6 Preliminary chapter outline 
 
This research is divided into five chapters. Chapter One serves as an introduction to the 
research. The constitutional problem which led to this research is discussed.  The chapter also 
set out the objectives and the importance of the research. The research methodology used in 
carrying out the research was explained. Chapter Two provided a critical analysis of the 
taxpayer’s constitutional right to a free trial as contemplated in section 35(3) of the 
Constitution. This chapter also considered the origins, nature, scope and the importance of 
this right in the constitutional sphere. Chapter Three dealt with reverse burden of proof and 
an evidentiary burden and their constitutionality in South Africa. A brief comparative study 
of the constitutionality of the reverse burden of proof and evidentiary burden in other 
jurisdictions like Canada, United Kingdom and United States of America has also been 
presented.  
                                                            
40Act 51 of 1977. 
41Act 91 of 1964. 
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Chapter Four considered the practical application of the presumption created by section 
235(2) of the Tax Administrative Act42 and investigated whether this presumption creates a 
reverse burden of proof43 or an evidentiary burden.44 To reach a conclusion on this matter, a 
strong comparative approach was adopted by looking at how South African courts have 
treated the presumption created by section 102(4) of the Customs and Excise Act45 which is 
similar and has the same effect on the taxpayer as the presumption created by section 235(2) 
of the Tax Administrative Act.46 Chapter Five summarised the research and provided the 
conclusion to the research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
42Act 28 of 2011. 
43 According to Landa, J. and Ramjohn,M. (2013). Unlocking Evidence (2ed) at 26, the burden of proof refers to 
the legal obligation to prove a point in contention or a fact in issue in order to convince the judge during a trial. 
A reverse burden of proof in a criminal matter refers to a shift in the burden of proof from the state to the 
accused.  
44 According to Corbett J in Southern Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services,44 an 
evidentiary burden refers to “the duty cast upon a litigant to adduce evidence in order to combat a prima facie 
case made by his opponent.”  
45Act 91 of 1964. 
46Act 28 of 2011. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
AN ACCUSED TAXPAYER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO A FAIR TRIAL
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Central to the present research is the notion of the right to a fair trial. This chapter will 
provide a critical analysis of the taxpayer’s constitutional right to a free trial as contemplated 
by section 35(3) of the Constitution.47 While also looking at the taxpayer’s constitutional 
right to a free trial, this chapter provides a detailed analysis of the historical origins and the 
scope of the right to a fair trial. Thereafter, an account will be provided reflecting on the 
importance of the right to a fair trial and specifically the right to be presumed innocent in 
foreign jurisdictions such as Canada, the United States of America and the United Kingdom. 
 
The right to fair trial was not constitutionally entrenched in the South African law until 
1994.48 On 27 April 1994, the first Interim Constitution49 came into force. One of its main 
purposes was to redefine the public values in the light of newly defined common interests by 
guaranteeing certain fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights50 such as a person’s right to 
equality, privacy and property, and access to information, justice and a fair trial.51 The right 
to a fair trial was embodied in section 25(3) of the Interim Constitution.52 The purpose of 
section 25(3) of the Interim Constitution53 was set out by the court in S v Nombewu.54 In this 
case, the appellant was arrested and made a pointing out55 without being given the mandatory 
warning as envisaged by section 25(1)(a) of the Interim Constitution. One of the main issues 
faced by the court was the extent to which the appellant could rely on the protection of the 
                                                            
47 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
48Skeen, A. (2000). The Right to a Fair Trial in the South African Law 110. 
49 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.  
50 The Bill of Rights  was contained in chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution. 
51Muller, E. (2010). A Framework for Wealth Transfer Taxation in South Africa at 57. 
52The Interim Constitution was temporary measure whist the new Constitution was being drafted. 
53The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
54S v Nombewu, 1996 (2) SACR 396 (E).  
55 According to Bassiouni, M. (1995). The Protection of Human Rights in African Criminal Proceedings at 92, a 
pointing out refers to where an accused person points out something to the police, and the pointing out has been 
considered as part of a confession of which evidence is inadmissible.  
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Interim Constitution56 where his arrest and pointing out had taken place before the Interim 
Constitution57 had been enacted.58 Jones J59, for the majority, stated that: 
 
The purpose of section 25(3) of the Interim Constitution60 was to reinforce 
and preserve the presumption of innocence, the right to silence, the right of 
an accused not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, and his 
right not to be compelled to make a confession or admission which could be 
used in evidence against him.  
 
Consequently, the court held that an appellant’s trial had not been unfair because he was 
warned in terms of the Judges’ Rules of his right to refrain from making a statement and that 
if he did make a statement it could be used against him. In light of this judgment, it is 
common cause that section 25(3) of the Interim Constitution61 was the first step towards 
affording all accused persons a constitutional right to a fair trial. 
 
The enactment of the Interim Constitution placed South Africa in a position in which taxation 
becomes a legitimate instrument of achieving national and democratic objectives.62 Certain 
discriminatory provisions in fiscal statutes were deleted or amended.63 On 8 May 1996, the 
new Constitution was adopted.64 This brought a major shift in the legal policies of the 
country.65 One of the major significant features of the advent of the 1996 Constitution is that 
the scope and ambit of the right to a fair trial was further entrenched and broadened.66 Prior to 
1994, the common law67 and the Criminal Procedure Act68 governed the criminal procedure 
and the rights of the accused person to a fair trial.69 The Constitution is now the supreme 
                                                            
56The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
57The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.  
58 Jagwanth, S. (1997). “Constitutional Application Recent Cases” SAJCJ 227 vl 10 at 227. 
59 S v Nombewu, 1996 (2) SACR 396 (E) at 403. 
60The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
61The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.  
62The Interim Report of the Katz Commission (1994) at paragraph 1.4.2 (b). 
63Croome, B.J. (2010). Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa at 11. 
64The Constitution was adopted on 8 May 1996, amended on 11 October 1996, promulgated on 18 
December 1996 and implemented on 4 February 1997. See the Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
Assembly in re: Certification of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC).  
65 Croome, B.J. (2002) “Constitutional Law and Taxpayer’s Rights in South Africa – An Overview” (Acta 
Juridica 1 at 2. 
66Steytler, N. (1998) Constitutional Criminal Procedure at 215. 
67Common law is also known as case law or precedent. It can be defined as that law which has been developed 
by judges through decisions of courts and similar tribunals. 
68 Act 51 of 1977. 
69Skeen, A. (2000). The Right to a Fair Trial in the South African Law at 110. 
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law.70 The supremacy of the Constitution71 is enshrined by section 2 of the Constitution 
which provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of the country and that any law or 
conduct which is inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled.72 Section 39(2) of the Constitution73 also provides that when interpreting any 
legislation, courts must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. The 
implication of these provisions is that the Criminal Procedure Act74 and other fiscal statutes, 
including the Tax Administration Act,75 must be tested against the provisions of the 
Constitution.76 The Constitutional Court will declare any statute invalid, including a fiscal 
statute, if such statute is found to be inconsistent with the Constitution. In support of this 
submission, the Katz Commission77 stated that: 
 
The tax system is subject to the Constitution and must conform to society’s 
commitment to the Rule of Law. This means not only that the system 
should be effective in the enforcement of all tax laws, equally and 
irrespective of status but also that citizens’ right to be taxed strictly in 
accordance with the terms of those laws should be scrupulously protected 
both in the design of those laws and in their implementation. 
 
The sentiment that the tax system is subject to the Constitution78 has also been expressed by 
the court in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v C: SARS.79 In this case, Lauray was 
indebted to the Commissioner of SARS for customs duties80 amounting to R3, 26 million. 
                                                            
70 Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the Constitution is that it is the supreme law of our country and that 
any law or conduct which is inconsistent with it is invalid.  
71 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
72South African Police Service v Public Servants Association 2007(3) SA521 (CC) at 25.  
73 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
74 Act 51 of 1977. 
75Act 28 of 2011. 
76The principle of “supremacy of the constitution” indicates that legislation should primarily abide by the 
principles set out in the Constitution. Any legislative provision in conflict with the Constitution may be declared 
unconstitutional, in which case such provision will be of no force and effect. .  
77 The Commission of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa at 73. 
78 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
79First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v C: SARS 2002 (7) JTLR 250.  
80The Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 defined customs duty as any amount of tax for which any person is 
liable in respect of all goods imported into or exported out of the Republic or any other goods manufactured in 
the Republic. The primary purpose of imposing customs duty by different governments is to protect each 
country's economy, residents, jobs and the environment by controlling the flow of goods, especially restrictive 
and prohibited goods, into and out of the country.  
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She agreed to pay off her debts in monthly instalments. However, Lauray went insolvent81 
and her estate was sequestrated.82 In order to collect the debt owed, section 114 of the 
Customs and Excise Act83 allowed the Commissioner of SARS to sell goods without prior 
authorisation by a court. Secondly, the Commissioner may sell goods to collect the debt owed 
even where the goods in question do not belong to the debtor but to some third party. The 
Commissioner wanted to sell Lauray’s car which was still owned by the First National Bank 
of South Africa (FNB). The FNB then launched a constitutional challenge before the 
Constitutional Court contending that section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act84 constitutes 
an unjustified infringement of its constitutional rights to have access to the courts in the 
settlement of disputes,85 to the protection of its property86 and to its freedom to choose a 
trade.87 In deciding this legal question, the court emphasized that  
 
 No matter how indispensable fiscal statutory provisions are for the 
economic well-being of the country, they are however not immune to the 
discipline of the Constitution. 
 
 Accordingly, the court held that the section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act88 was not 
compatible with the Constitutional normative standards. Section 195(1) of the Constitution89 
also provides that public administration must be governed by the democratic values and 
principles enshrined in the Constitution. In this regard, it is a common cause that the 
Constitution is now the supreme law of the land; all legislation including the Tax 
                                                            
81 Venter v Volkskas Ltd 1973 (3) SA 175 (T) defined insolvency as a situation when debtor’s liabilities (fairly 
valued) exceed his assets (fairly valued). It is important to note that the court in Realizations Ltd v Ager 1961 (4) 
SA 10 (D) at paragraph 11-12 held that proof of an inability to pay debts is only prima facie evidence of 
insolvency not necessarily insolvency. 
82 In Ex parte Henning 1981 (3) SA 843 (O) at paragraph 45, the court defined sequestration as a formal order 
declaring that the debtor is insolvent. The main purpose of a sequestration order is to ensure the orderly and fair 
distribution of a debtor's assets if his assets are not sufficient to pay all his creditors in full. 
83Act 91 of 1964. 
84Act 91 of 1964. 
85 Section 34 of the Constitution provides that “everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be 
resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, 
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.”  
86 Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that: “no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of 
general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.” 
87 Section 22 of the Constitution provides that “every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or 
profession freely. The practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by law.”  
88Act 91 of 1964. 
89 Section 195(1) of the Constitution provides that public administration must be governed by the democratic 
values and principles enshrined in the Constitution.   
21 
 
Administration Act90 must conform to the rights set out in the Constitution, which includes 
taxpayer’s the right to a fair trial. 
 
2.2 An Accused Taxpayer’s Right to a right to fair trial 
 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution contains the Bill of Rights, which is similar to the Bill of Rights 
contained in chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution. The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and 
binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.91 It is considered to 
be the cornerstone of democracy in the Republic of South Africa;92 it enshrines the rights of 
all people and affirms fundamental democratic values of human dignity,93 equality94 and 
freedom.95 The state is therefore under a peremptory obligation96 to respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the rights in the Bill of rights.97  Section 35 of the Constitution falls under Chapter 2 
and deals with the rights of arrested, detained and accused persons. In terms of section 35(3) 
of the Constitution,98 every accused has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right ‘to be 
presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings’. In essence, 
there is no duty placed on the accused person to say anything during plea proceedings or the 
trial, nor is he obliged to testify during his trial. The accused has a clear right to remain silent 
at his trial when he so decides and it would be to his advantage, and no adverse inference 
may be drawn from this by either the prosecution or the court.99 The aspects of section 35 of 
the Constitution will be addressed separately in the following paragraphs. 
                                                            
90Act 28 of 2011. 
91 In terms of Section 8(1) of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
Executive and all organs of state. 
92 The founding provisions of the Constitution embodied in Chapter 1 section 1(a)–(d)  provide that the Republic 
of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on fundamental values such as human dignity, the 
achievement of equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism, non-sexism, the 
supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law, universal adult suffrage, a national voters’ roll, regular elections 
and a multi-party system of democratic government. 
93 See Section 10 of the Constitution which provides that everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have 
their dignity respected and protected. 
94 See Section 9 of the Constitution which provides that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to 
equal protection and benefit of the law.  
95 Section 12 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, 
which includes the right (a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; (b) not to be detained 
without trial; (c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; (d) not to be tortured 
in any way; and (e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. 
96 In Ferreira v Levin and Vryenhoek v Powell 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at paragraph 185, the court explained a 
peremptory obligation as an obligation to which the state does not have the power to exercise its discretion not 
to uphold it. 
97 See chapter 2(1)(B) of the South African Bill of Rights. 
98 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
99 Mthembu, MH. (1998) ‘The constitutionality of presumptions in South African law’, The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa, Vol. 31 at 213-227. 
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2.2.1 An accused taxpayer’s right to be presumed innocent 
 
(i) A brief history of the presumption of innocence 
 
The advent of the thirteenth century brought about major developments in European criminal 
law and procedure.100 Some of the major developments include the adoption of inquisitorial 
procedures in Continental Europe and the advancements of accusatorial principles in English 
Criminal law.101 In both inquisitorial and accusatorial systems, the prosecution was required 
to prove the accused’s guilt without a doubt, which embraced the belief that it is better to 
acquit a guilty person than to condemn an innocent person. This was the seed of the concept 
of the presumption of innocence.102 
(ii) Content of the presumption of innocence 
 
In South Africa, the right to be presumed innocent is regarded as one of the most fundamental 
rights in the system of criminal justice.103 According to Naughton,104 the presumption of 
innocence requires the criminal justice system to presume that suspects of a crime or 
defendants in criminal trials did not commit the offence. This means that there is a firm 
burden of proof placed on the state to prove that the accused is guilty.105 The requirement that 
the state must bear the burden of proof in a criminal trial stems from the view that the state 
must explain why it brings an action against the accused.106 In Woolmington v The DPP,107 
Woolmington was charged with the murder of his wife. She had left him and returned to live 
with her mother. Woolmington went to the house with a gun. He said he intended to frighten 
her with the threat that he would kill himself if she did not return home. The two disagreed 
and Woolmington killed his wife. During the trial he admitted to the killing but he stated that 
he did not intend to kill her. In deciding the, matter, Lord Sankey108 stated that  
 
                                                            
100Schwikkard, P.J. (2001). The Presumption of Innocence at 1.  
101Schwikkard, P.J. (2001). The Presumption of Innocence at 1. 
102Schwikkard, P.J. (2001). The Presumption of Innocence at 1. 
103Steytler, N. (1998). Constitutional Criminal Procedure at 320. 
104Naughton, M.( 2011) “How the presumption of innocence renders the innocent vulnerable to wrongful 
convictions”at 40. 
105Skeen, A. (2000). The Right to a Fair Trial in the South African Law at 112. 
106 Morton, J.C. &  Hutchinson, S,C.(1987). The presumption of Innocence at 2. 
107Woolmington v. The DPP [1935] A.C. 462 at 481.  
108Woolmington v. The DPP [1935] A.C. 462 at 481.  
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The threshold of evidential proof that an accused person committed the 
alleged criminal offence is high as the evidence to be adduced by the state 
against the suspect must be beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden is a 
‘golden thread’ that ran through the common law of England. 
 
Another authoritative support for the right to be presumed innocent as a fundamental 
principle of our law was expressed by the court in R v Benjamin109 in which Buchanan J110 
noted that 
 
But in a criminal trial there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the 
accused, which must be rebutted. Therefore there should not be a 
conviction unless the crime charged has been clearly proved to have been 
committed by the accused. Where the evidence is not reasonably 
inconsistent with the prisoner's innocence, or where a reasonable doubt as 
to his guilt exists, there should be an acquittal. 
 
The judgment of the court in S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso,111 is also of paramount significance 
in the South African law in as far as the right of presumption of innocence is concerned. The 
matter in this case concerned section 21 (1)(a)(i) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act  
which provides that if an accused has been found in possession of more than 115 grams of 
dagga, he or she will be presumed to have been dealing in dagga and will be convicted of the 
offence of dealing unless that person proves that he or she has not been dealing in dagga.112 
The court had to consider whether or not this provision infringes upon the right of the 
accused to be presumed innocent as provided in terms of section 25(3)(c) of the Interim 
Constitution. With regard to the right to be presumed innocent, O’Regan J113 emphasised 
that:   
 
The presumption of innocence is an established principle of South African 
law which places the burden of proof squarely on the prosecution. The 
                                                            
109R v Benjamin 3 EDC 337. 
110R v Benjamin 3 EDC 337 at 338. 
111S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC). 
112 Section 21 (1)(a)(i) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act provides that: if in the prosecution of any person 
for an offence referred to is proved that the accused Was found in possession of dagga exceeding 115 grams….it 
shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the accused dealt in such dagga or substance. 
113S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) at paragraph 15.   
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entrenchment of the presumption of innocence in section 25(3)(c) must be 
interpreted in this context. It requires that the prosecution bear the burden 
of proving all the elements of a criminal charge. A presumption which 
relieves the prosecution of part of that burden could result in the conviction 
of an accused person despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or 
her guilt. Such a presumption is in breach of the presumption of innocence 
and therefore offends section 25(3)(c). 
 
Consequently, the Court found that the impugned provision imposed a legal burden on the 
accused person to prove on balance of probabilities that he or she has not been dealing in 
dagga. The court further held that the section 21(1)(a)(i) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking 
Act  relieves the prosecution of its legal burden to prove that the accused was “dealing in 
dagga” as opposed to mere possession which could result in the conviction of an accused 
person, despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt. Such a presumption 
is in breach of the presumption of innocence and therefore offends section 25(3)(c) of the 
Interim Constitution. The court went further to consider whether the breach of section 
25(3)(c) of the Interim Constitution by section 21(1)(a)(i) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking 
Act could be justified in terms of section 33 of the Interim Constitution. In considering 
whether the breach of section 25(3)(c) of the Interim Constitution was reasonable or 
justifiable in an open and democratic society  based on freedom and equality, the court had to  
balance the aim of the Act (prohibition of drug abuse and trafficking) and its effects against 
the nature of infringement caused by the Act. The court recognised that the prohibition of 
drug abuse and trafficking was a demanding social resolution. However, the court remained 
unconvinced on whether the impugned provision substantially furthered the purpose of the 
Act of combatting the trafficking of illegal drugs because the court did not find any logical 
connection between the facts proved (possession of dagga) and the facts presumed (drug 
dealing). As a result, the breach of section 25(3)(c) of the Interim Constitution by section 
21(1)(a)(i) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act was not reasonably justifiable in terms of 
section 33(1) of the Interim Constitution. 
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The importance of the judgments of the court in Woolmington v The DPP,114 R v Benjamin115 
and S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso,116 is that they clearly articulate that in a criminal case, the 
accused has the right to be presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is placed on the 
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime charged has been committed by the 
accused. In light of this, it is a common cause that in all criminal cases it is for the state to 
establish the guilt of the accused, not for the accused to establish his innocence.  
 
Where a taxpayer makes a false statement or entry in any books of account, the presumption 
in terms ofsection 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act is that the taxpayer is guilty of fraud, 
an act which is often punishable by a heavy criminal penalty. In this regard, the presumption 
of innocence requires that where a taxpayer makes a false statement or entry in any books of 
account, he or she must be presumed innocent until SARS117 has proved that the false 
statement was made with the intention of evading assessment. 
 
(iii) Rationale for the presumption 
 
The rationale for the presumption is wide and varied. It ranges from a concern that individual 
rights need to be protected from the potentially coercive authority of the state to policy 
concerns of maintaining the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.118 Despite the rationale 
for the presumption being wide, it has at its centre recognition that the presumption of 
innocence is necessary to reduce the possibility of erroneous conviction.119  This sentiment 
has been expressed by the court in S v Manamela.120 The case considered section 37 of the 
General Law Amendment Act, which makes it an offence to acquire stolen goods otherwise 
than at a public sale without having reasonable cause to believe that the person disposing of 
them was entitled to do so. By requiring an accused to prove that he had such belief, reverses 
the normal criminal onus of proof.  The court had to decide whether this reverse onus 
infringes upon the accused’s constitutional right to silence and the presumption of innocence. 
With regard to the right to be presumed innocent, Madala, Sachs and Yacoob JJ121 stated that:  
                                                            
114Woolmington v. The DPP [1935] A.C. 462 at 481.  
115R v Benjamin 3 EDC 337 at 338. 
116S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC); 1995 (12) BCLR 1579 (CC) at paragraph 15.   
117 Currie, I. & De Waal, J. (2013).  The Bill of Rights Handbook at 753. 
118 Currie, I. & De Waal, J. (2013).  The Bill of Rights Handbook at 753. 
119 Currie, I. & De Waal, J. (2013).  The Bill of Rights Handbook at 753. 
120S v Manamela and Others 2000(1) SACR 414 (CC). 
121S v Manamela and Others 2000(1) SACR 414 (CC) at paragraph 26. 
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The purpose of the presumption of innocence is to minimise the risk that 
innocent persons may be convicted and imprisoned. It does so by imposing 
on the prosecution the burden of proving the essential elements of the 
offence charged beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby reducing to an 
acceptable level the risk of error in a court’s overall assessment of evidence 
tendered in the course of a trial. 
 
Another authoritative expression of support for the view that the notion of presumption is to 
reduce the possibility of erroneous conviction, has been expressed by the court in the 
Canadian case of R v Oakes.122 In this case, Oakes was found with eight one-gram vials of 
hashish oil and $619.45. He claimed that he had had ten vials for his own use, and that the 
money was left over from his worker’s compensation cheque. He was charged with 
"possession of drugs for the purposes of trafficking" under section 8 of the Narcotic Control 
Act. The section stated that a person was presumed to be in possession for the purposes of 
trafficking unless the accused can "establish” that they were not in possession for this 
purpose. He was convicted at trial. On appeal, the court stated that it is clear that the Act 
creates a reverse onus on the defendant which violates the Charter right to the presumption of 
innocence. The section was deemed to be unconstitutional. In this case, the dictum expressed 
by Chief Justice Dickson123 reflected on the importance of the presumption as follows: 
 
The presumption of innocence protects the fundamental liberty and human 
dignity of any and every person accused by the state of criminal conduct. It 
offers the society assurance that people innocent of crime shall not be 
convicted and that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a 
guilty man to go free. An individual charged with a criminal offence faces 
grave social and personal consequences, including potential loss of physical 
liberty, subjection to social stigma and ostracism from the community, as 
well as other social, psychological and economic harms. In light of the 
gravity of these consequences, the presumption of innocence is crucial. It 
ensures that until the state proves an accused's guilt beyond all reasonable 
doubt, he or she is innocent. This is essential in a society committed to 
fairness and social justice. The presumption of innocence confirms our faith 
                                                            
122R v Oakes (1986) 50CR (3d) 1(SCC). 
123R v Oakes (1986) 50CR (3d) 1(SCC) at 212-13. 
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in humankind; it reflects our belief that individuals are decent and law-
abiding members of the community until proven otherwise. 
 
 The notion of presumption of innocence is also linked to the need to “level” the scales of 
justice.124 At every criminal trial, the accused starts his case with fewer resources at his 
disposal to pursue the case than the state. The state has enough money to afford legal 
representation of high quality to pursue its case. This puts the state at a better starting point 
than the accused person.125 Affording the accused the right to be presumed innocent is 
therefore an attempt to “level” the scales of justice.126 This view has also been supported by 
Schwikkard127 who stated that: 
 
The prosecution has the dual advantage of dictating the nature of 
proceedings and of being well prepared to participate in them. The state 
employs professional investigators to detect crime and gather evidence, 
utilizing offence definitions to structure the shape and direction of their 
inquiries. 
 
Given the dual advantage that the state enjoys over the suspect or the accused, it is apparent 
that the notion of presumption of innocence is of crucial significance in our criminal law and 
procedure, so as to ensure that the scales of justice are balanced more equally and thereby 
enhance the overall accuracy of the decision making process. According to Underwood,128 
the presumption of innocence does not simply restore an accurate balance; it also introduces a 
deliberate imbalance, tilting the scales in favour of the defendant. In essence, it represents a 
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man 
than to let a guilty man go free. 
 
The presumption of innocence is also concerned with the protection of the legitimacy of the 
justice system in that erroneous convictions will weaken the deterrent function of the criminal 
                                                            
124Naughton, M. (2013) The Innocent and the Criminal Justice System at 123. 
125Naughton, M. (2013) The Innocent and the Criminal Justice System at 124. 
126Naughton, M. & Tan, G. (2010) Claims of Innocence: An introduction to wrongful convictions and how they 
might be challenged at 133. 
127Schwikkard, P.J. (2001). The Presumption of Innocence at 88. 
128Underwood, B.D. (1977).The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 
YALE L.J. 1299, at 1309-10.  
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law. According to Kaplan,129 ‘erroneous convictions cast doubt upon the whole legal system’. 
In this respect, it can be submitted that the notion of presumption of innocence gives 
confidence within society in the judicial system. 
 
According to Schwikkard,130 the presumption of innocence also serves a symbolic function. 
The requirement that guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt signals the seriousness 
of criminal convictions. The reason for doing this is to enhance the moral force and deterrent 
effect of criminal sanctions and affirms society’s shared moral purpose.131 
 
(iv) The scope of the right to be presumed innocent 
 
The scope of the presumption of innocence has been clearly defined by the Constitutional 
court in S v Zuma.132 In this case, the accused were indicted on two counts of murder and one 
of robbery. The prosecution tendered confessions which had been made by two of the 
accused before a magistrate and reduced to writing as admissible confessions. The two 
accused testified that they had made their statements by reason of assaults on them by the 
police and the threat of further assaults. The policemen concerned denied this.  In terms of 
section 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act,133 which provided that where a 
confession by an accused person has been made to a magistrate or has been confirmed and 
reduced to writing in the presence of a magistrate, it shall be admissible in evidence against 
the accused. Further provided by the sub-paragraphs of this section is that the confession 
shall be presumed to have been freely and voluntarily made by the accused in his or her 
sound and sober senses and without having been unduly influenced, unless the contrary is 
proved.The implication of section 217(1)(b)(ii) is that, where an accused avers that a 
confession is inadmissible, he or she bears the onus to show on balance of probabilities that 
the confession has not been freely and voluntarily made by him, in his sound and sober 
senses, and without having been unduly influenced to make it. The Constitutional court had 
to decide whether or not section 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act134 was in 
violation of  the right to a fair trial embodied in the Constitution. The court stated that: 
 
                                                            
129Kaplan, J. (1968) 'Decision Theory and the Fact finding Process’ Stanford Law Review 1065 at 1072. 
130 Schwikkard, P.J. (2001). The Presumption of Innocence at 90. 
131David, S. Weissbrodt, R. W. (1988). The Right to a Fair Trial at 89. 
132S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
133 Act 51 of 1977. 
134 Act 51 of 1977. 
29 
 
It is a longstanding principle of English and South African law of evidence 
that the prosecution should prove that any confession on which it wished to 
rely was freely and voluntarily made. 
 
The court held further that section 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act135 places the 
burden of proving that a confession recorded by a magistrate was not free and voluntary on 
the accused, thereby violating the right to a fair trial.136 The significance of the Zuma137 
judgment is that it clearly provides that the right to be presumed innocent will be infringed 
where there is a possibility that the accused will face conviction despite the existence of a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
The judgment of the court in S v Dzukuda138 is also of crucial significance in South African 
law in as far as the scope of the right to be presumed innocent is concerned. In this case, the 
three accused were found guilty of the rape of girls under the age of 16 years. Although the 
High Court in this case was concerned with the crime created by section 51 of the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act,139 this case cannot be overlooked in as far as the scope of the right to 
be presumed innocent is concerned. Justice Ackermann140 held that, “the presumption of 
innocence does not apply to the accused during the interrogation process or proceedings after 
conviction.” In this regard, it is a common cause that the judgment of the court in S v 
Dzukuda141 is important in South African law because it demarcates the the scope of the right 
to be presumed innocent, which forms part of the right to a fair trial. 
 
2.2.2 An Accused Taxpayer’s Right to Remain Silent 
 
The right to remain silent is a natural consequence of the presumption of innocence which 
applies in both criminal and civil proceedings.142 The common law rule is that the accused or 
a suspect cannot be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence, either before or during the 
                                                            
135 Act 51 of 1977. 
136 The court also stated that the Criminal Procedure Act violates the common law rule requiring the prosecution 
to prove that a confession has been freely and voluntarily made by the accused.  
137S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
138S v Dzukuda and Others; S v Tshilo  2000 (11) BCLR 1252 (CC). 
139 Act of 1997. 
140S v Dzukuda and Others; S v Tshilo  2000 (11) BCLR 1252 (CC) at paragraph 4. 
141S v Dzukuda and Others; S v Tshilo  2000 (11) BCLR 1252 (CC).  
142 PJ Schwikkard and SE Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3 ed (2009) 123. 
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trial. Thus this is the reason section 196(1)(a)the Criminal Procedure Act143 prescribes that an 
accused shall not be called as a witness except upon his own application. Section 35(1) of the 
Constitution explicitly provides that everyone who is arrested has the right to remain silent 
and to be informed of that right and of the consequences of not remaining silent. Evidence 
obtained in a manner that violates the accused’s right to remain silent will not be admissible 
as evidence before the court if the admission thereof would render the trial unfair or 
otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. In essence, an accused’s right to 
remain silent entails that the accused taxpayer is under no legal obligation to act as a witness 
against himself before the court. In this regard, the accused’s right to remain silent is not 
important in the South African criminal and civil law only, but in the law of taxation as well.  
 
The right to silence has been described by the court in S v Moller144 as an aspect of the 
adversarial trial which entails the absence of any legal obligation on the accessed to speak. 
According to Skeen,145 the right to remain silent is an offshoot of the privilege against self-
incrimination. The same view has been expressed by the court in S v Manamela146 in which 
the court stated that “the right to silence, like the presumption of innocence, is firmly rooted 
in both our common law and statute” and ”is inextricably linked to the right against self-
incrimination and the principle of non-compellability of an accused person as a witness at his 
or her trial”. The same notion has been expressed in the English case of Blunt v Park Lane 
Hotel Ltd147 in which Goddard LJ148 stated that “the rule is that no one is bound to answer 
any question if the answer thereto would, in the opinion of the judge, have a tendency to 
expose the deponent to any criminal charge”. 
 
(i) The rationale of the right  
 
The rationale for these rules is that it is repellent to public opinion to compel the accused or 
witness to give answers exposing them to criminal punishment and that people might not 
testify freely in the absence of some kind of privilege against self-incrimination.149 
 
                                                            
143 Act 51 of 1977 sec 196(1)(a). 
144S v Moller 1990 (3) SA 876 (A) at 884.   
145 Skeen, A. (1993).  “A Bill of Rights and the presumption of innocence” SAJHR 525 at 535. 
146S v Manamela and Others 2000(1) SACR 414 (CC) at paragraph 35. 
147Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd 1942 (2) KB. 
148Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd 1942 (2) KB at 253.   
149 Skeen, A. (1993). “A Bill of Rights and the presumption of innocence” SAJHR 525 at 536. 
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(ii) The objects of the right 
 
The right to remain silent before and during trial and to be presumed innocent are important 
interrelated rights aimed ultimately at protecting the fundamental freedom and dignity of an 
accused person.150 This protection is important in the context of the protection of human 
dignity, freedom and equality.151 
 
The fundamental rationale of the right to remain silent has been clearly outlined by the court 
in Thebus and Another v S.152  In this case, Mr Thebus and Mr Adams (the appellants) were 
convicted and sentenced by the Cape High Court on a count of murder and two counts of 
attempted murder. They had been part of a protesting group involved in a shoot-out with a 
reputed drug dealer in Ocean View, Cape Town. As a result of the cross-fire, a young girl 
was killed and two others wounded. The shots which killed the girl and wounded the other 
persons came from the group of which first and second appellant were part. However, there 
was no direct evidence that any of the appellants fired the shots. The appellants were 
convicted on the basis of the common law doctrine of common purpose and each was 
sentenced to a period of eight years imprisonment, suspended for five years on certain 
conditions. The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) confirmed these findings. The appellants 
approached the Constitutional Court on two issues: firstly, whether the SCA acted 
unconstitutionally in failing to develop the doctrine of common purpose, thereby violating 
their rights to dignity and freedom of the person as well as their  right to a fair trial, which 
includes the right to be presumed innocent; secondly, whether the first appellant’s right to 
silence contained in section 35(1)(a) of the Constitution had been infringed by the negative 
inference drawn by reason of the late disclosure of alibi defence. With regard to the rationale 
of the right to remain silent, the court noted as follows: 
The underlying rationale of the right to remain silent is three pronged: (1) 
concerns for reliability by deterring improper investigation which relates 
directly to the truth-seeking function of the court; (2) a belief that an 
individual has a right to privacy and dignity which, whilst not absolute, may 
not be lightly eroded; (3) the right to remain silent is necessary to give 
                                                            
150Mubangizi, J.C.(2004).The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide at 198. 
151Skeen, A. (1993). “A Bill of Rights and the presumption of innocence” SAJHR 525 at 535. 
152Thebus and Another v S 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC).  
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effect to the privilege against self-incrimination and the presumption of 
innocence. 
 
The right to remain silent is specified both in pre-trial (section 35(1)(a)) and trial procedures 
(section 35(3)(h)). In essence, the accused must be promptly advised of his or her right to 
remain silent and the consequences of not remaining silent. According to Skeen,153 the advice 
must be conveyed in a language that is understood by the accused; failure to properly advise 
the accused about his or her right to remain silent is a breach of the constitutional right to a 
fair trial. 
 
(iii) The scope of the right to remain silent 
 
The scope of the right to remain silent has been clearly clarified by the court in S v Boesak.154 
In this case, Dr Allan Boesak, who had occupied a prominent position in church circles and in 
the anti-apartheid struggle, was convicted on one count of fraud and three counts of theft in 
the Cape High Court and sentenced to six years imprisonment. The fraud count and the first 
theft count related to R259 161 donated by an American musician to a children’s trust fund 
controlled by Dr Boesak. The third count related to amounts totalling R147 160 he had taken 
for himself from another fund he controlled. On appeal the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) 
set aside one of the theft counts, altered the amount involved in another theft count and 
reduced the sentence to three years imprisonment. Dr Boesak then applied for special leave to 
appeal from the SCA to the Constitutional Court, alleging that his constitutional rights had 
been infringed. Langa DP,155 speaking for the Constitutional Court, pointed out that: 
 
The right to remain silent has different applications at different stages of a 
criminal prosecution. On arrest a person cannot be compelled to make any 
confession or admission that may be used against her or him; later at trial 
there is no obligation to testify. The fact that she or he is not obliged to 
testify does not mean that no consequences arise as a result. If there is 
evidence that requires a response and if no response is forthcoming, that is, 
if the accused chooses to exercise her or his right to remain silent in the face 
                                                            
153 Skeen, A. (1993). “A Bill of Rights and the presumption of innocence” SAJHR 525 at 535. 
154S v Boesak 2001 (1) SACR 1 (CC).  
155 S v Boesak 2001 (1) SACR 1 (CC) at paragraph 24. 
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of such evidence, the Court may, in the circumstances, be justified to 
conclude that the evidence is sufficient, in the absence of an explanation, to 
prove the guilt of the accused. This will, of course, depend on the quality of 
the evidence and the weight given to that evidence by the Court. 
 
In Osman & another v Attorney-General, Transvaal156 the Constitutional Court considered a 
challenge to a provision of the General Laws Amendment Act which creates an offence 
where a person who is found in possession of goods which are reasonably suspected to have 
been stolen, is unable to give a satisfactory account of such possession. The appellants, (the 
Osmans) argued that the provision conflicts with: (1) the right of an arrested or detained 
person not to be compelled to make a confession or admission which could be used in 
evidence against him or her, and (2) the rights of an accused person to be presumed innocent, 
to remain silent and not to give evidence at trial. The court succinctly stated that: 
 
In an adversarial legal system, once the prosecution has produced evidence 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case, an accused has an election to 
produce evidence to rebut the case or not. The court held further that an 
accused who fails to produce evidence to rebut the case was at risk. The fact 
that an accused is put to such an election is not a breach of the right to 
silence. If the right to silence were to be so interpreted, it would destroy the 
fundamental nature of our adversarial system of criminal justice. 
 
Consequently, the court held that that the provision is not in conflict with these rights under 
the Interim Constitution. 
 
2.3 The right to be presumed innocent in foreign jurisdictions 
 
The presumption of innocence is not only important in the South African law, but also in 
various countries across the world. For example, it is protected in Canada, China, the United 
States of America and the United Kingdom. It is also protected in various international 
                                                            
156Osman & another v Attorney-General, Transvaa 1998 (4) SA 1224 (CC) at paragraph 22. 
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human rights instruments such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights,157 and the 
European Convention on Human Rights.158 
 
(i) The United Kingdom 
 
The case of Woolmington v The DPP,159  is highly regarded as the landmark case on the 
presumption of innocence. The case highlighted the significance of the presumption of 
innocence in as far as the right to a fair trial is concerned. The court also stressed that the 
notion of presumption of innocence requires the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused 
person, and that the proof must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Stressed further by the 
court was that the notion of presumption of innocence is immutable except under the 
following circumstances: 
(a) Where the accused person raised insanity as his or her defence. This has 
also been confirmed by the court in McNaghten160 in which the court 
stressed out that where the accused raised the defence of insanity, onus of 
proof is on the accused person to prove that, “at the time of committing the 
act, he was labouring under  a defect of reason, from the disease of the 
mind, as to not know the nature and quality  of the act he was doing; or , if  
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing  what was wrong”. 
 
(b) Where a statute provides for such an exception.161 
(c) In relation to statutory offences, where the burden of proof is placed on the 
accused person by implication.162 
 
Ibrahim v Regem,163 is also another leading case in the United Kingdom in as far as the 
presumption of innocence is concerned. In this case a private in the Indian army was 
convicted of the murder of a native officer. Soon after the murder, the commanding officer 
                                                            
157  Article 11(1) states: “everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.” 
158  Article 6(2) states: “everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law.” 
159Woolmington v. The DPP [1935] A.C. 462 at 481.  
160 McNaghten 1843 0 cl & Fin 200. 
161 This exception has been heavily criticized by Ashworth, A and Blake, M. (1996) 'The Presumption of 
Innocence in English Criminal Law' at 133–173. Ashworth seem to hold the view that if the legislature is free to 
impose strict liability whenever it wishes, the notion of presumption of innocence becomes a fallacy. 
162 Ashworth, A and Blake, M. (1996) 'The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal Law' at 133–173. 
163Ibrahim v Regem  1914-15 All ER 874. 
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went to see the appellant in custody and asked him why he did such an act. The appellant said 
that he killed the deceased because he has been abused by him in the past few days. The 
commanding officer wanted to appear before the court as a witness and use the ‘confession’ 
made by the appellant against him. Although the court had to decide on whether or not the 
accused made the ‘confession’ voluntarily, without fear or hope of getting the advantage held 
by the person to whom it was made, this case is important in that the court expressly 
pronounced that: 
 
The use of presumptions and inferences to prove an element of a crime 
imposes draconian encroachment on the accused’s right to be presumed 
innocent and allows men to go to jail without any evidence on one essential 
ingredient of the offence. It thus implicates the integrity of the judicial 
system . . . In practical effect; the use of these presumptions often means 
that the great barriers to the protection of procedural due process contained 
in the bill of rights are subtly diluted. 
 
Consequently, the court held that a provision which disregards the accused’s right to be 
presumed innocent is invalid and would not be entertained by any court in English law. 
 
(ii) Canada  
 
In Canada, just as in South Africa, the presumption of innocence has been afforded 
constitutional protection. Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
provides that any person charged with an offence has the right “to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal.”164 Section 7 of the Canadian Charter considered the presumption of innocence to be 
part and parcel to the right to life, liberty and security of the accused person. In terms of 
section 1 of the Charter, the right to be presumed innocent is subject only to reasonable 
limitation prescribed by law as can be justified in a free and democratic society.  
 
                                                            
164Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11). 
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In the Canadian law, the presumption of innocence implies that before the accused person can 
be criminally convicted, the court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that all the 
elements of the crime are present. R v Oakes165 is the first major decision by the Supreme 
Court of Canada, after the introduction of the Canadian Charter.166 In this case, the accused 
was found in unlawful possession of narcotic drugs. In terms of section 8 of the Narcotic 
Control Act, if a person was proved to be in unlawful possession of a narcotic, he was 
presumed to be in possession of it for the purpose of trafficking unless he proved the 
contrary. The accused argued that this provision was contrary to the presumption of 
innocence provided for by the Canadian Charter. The Canadian Supreme Court had to decide 
on the constitutional implication of section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act. It was held that: 
 
A provision which requires an accused to disapprove on balance of 
probabilities the existence of a presumed fact, which is an element of the 
offence in question, violates the presumption of innocence in section 11(d). 
The fact that the standard required on rebuttal is only on preponderance of 
probabilities does not render a reverse onus clause constitutional. Section 8 of 
the Narcotic Control Act infringes the presumption of innocence in section 
11(d) of the Charter by requiring the accused to prove he is not guilty of 
trafficking once the basic fact of possession is proven.  
 
The court went further to examine whether the infringement posed by section 8 of the 
Narcotic Control Act can be justified in terms of section 1 of the Charter, which provides for 
a reasonable limitation to the right to be presumed innocent. In this regard, the court observed 
that the standard of proof in terms of section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act allowed the 
possibility that the accused person could be convicted despite the existence of reasonable 
doubt. Further held by the court is that there was no rational connection between basic 
possession and the presumption of trafficking. Consequently, section 8 of the Narcotic 
Control Act was held to be radically and fundamentally inconsistent with the presumption 
and could not be justified in a free and democratic society. 
                                                            
165R v Oakes 1986 26 DLR 4th 200.   
166 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11). 
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In R v Schwartz167 the Canadian Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the 
provisions criminalizing possession of a restricted weapon without a registration certificate. 
The onus was placed on the accused to prove on balance of probabilities that they held such a 
certificate. In deciding this matter, the court examined the wording of the onus placed on the 
accused person and held that it did not require the accused person to prove or disprove any 
element of the offence. The court also emphasized that the onus placed upon the accused does 
not create any possibility that the accused could be found guilty of a crime, despite the 
existence of a reasonable doubt as to guilt. Consequently, the impugned provision was 
regarded to be in line with the Canadian constitutional values. The importance of this 
judgment is that it clearly demonstrates that Canadian Charter of Rights provides for the 
fundamental human rights. Any statute must therefore conform to it. Allied to this importance 
is that this judgment illustrates that the presumption of innocence embodied in 11(d) of the 
Charter will be infringed by a reverse onus provision or presumption of guilt which requires 
the accused to prove some fact on the balance of probabilities to avoid conviction. Similarly, a 
reverse onus provision or presumption of guilt which does not requires the accused to prove 
some fact on the balance of probabilities to avoid conviction will be compatible with the 
presumption of innocence embodied in 11(d) of the Charter. 
 
In R v Appleby168 the accused was charged with contravening the Canadian Criminal Code 
which provides that any person who drives a motor vehicle or who has the care or control of a 
motor vehicle whether it is in motion or not, while his ability to drive a motor vehicle is 
impaired by alcohol or a drug, is guilty of an offence. Section 237(1)(a) of the Criminal Code 
provides that: 
 
Where it is proved that the accused occupied the seat ordinarily occupied by 
the driver of a motor vehicle, he shall be deemed to have had the care or 
control of the vehicle unless he establishes that he did not enter or mount 
the vehicle for the purpose of setting it in motion.  
 
                                                            
167R v Schwartz1988 2 SCR 443. 
168 R v Appleby (1971) 21 DLR (3d) at 325. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada had do decide whether 237(1)(a) of the Code breached the 
presumption of innocence. Ritchie J,169 observed that the presumption placed an onus on the 
accused to prove on a balance of probabilities that he did not enter the vehicle with the 
intention of setting it in motion. According, the court concluded that section 237(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code contravened the accused’s right to be presumed innocent  provided by section 
11(d) of the Charter. 
 
(iii) The United States of America 
 
The United States of America Bill of Rights does not explicitly provide for the right to be 
presumed innocent, but it has been held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which 
warrant a right not to be deprived of life and liberty, also includes the presumption of 
innocence.170 
 
Tot v United States,171 is the first case relevant to the investigation of presumptions in the 
American jurisdiction. The court had to decide a constitutional matter involving a federal 
statute which provided that the possession of a firearm or ammunition by any person shall be 
presumptive evidence that such firearm or ammunition was shipped, transported or received, 
as the case maybe, by such person in violation of this Act. The court looked at whether there 
is any rational connection between the facts proved and the facts presumed. On the basis of 
this test, Justice Roberts172 held that there is no a reasonable connection between the facts 
proved and the fact presumed. In other words, there was no any legitimate reason being 
served by the impugned presumption of guilt. Consequently, the presumption was 
invalidated.  
  
 
 
 
                                                            
169 R v Appleby (1971) 21 DLR (3d) 325 at paragraph 44. 
170  Gray, A. (2012). “Constitutionally Protecting the Presumption of Innocence” University of Tasmania Law 
Review, at131-152. 
171Tot v United States 1943 319 All ER 463. 
172 Tot v United States 1943 319 All ER 463. 
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(iv) International law  
 
The presumption of innocence is also protected in various international instruments. Article 
11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights173 provides that “everyone charged with a 
penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a 
public trial”. Similarly, Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights174 provides that “everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” Article 6(2) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights175 provides that “everyone charged with a criminal offence 
shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.  According to Ashworth and 
Blake,176 the requirement that “everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law” envisaged by Article 6(2) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights177 requires  that the court should not start with the assumption 
that the accused committed the act with which he or she is being charged. In essence, onus to 
prove the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution; any legal doubt should be in favour 
of the accused. In this regard, it is apparent that the presumption of innocence has been 
accorded robust protection on international level. Article 66(3) of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court also recognized the presumption of innocence as a fundamental 
concept in the administration of justice. It provides that: “in order to convict the accused, the 
court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.” 
 
The above discussion on the right to be presumed innocent in foreign jurisdictions clearly 
highlighted that the presumption of innocence forms the core of the right to a fair trial. The 
presumption of innocence will be infringed if the provision of a statutory presumption creates 
a possibility that the accused person may be convicted, despite the existence of reasonable 
doubt. According to Hoffmann and Zeffertt,178 the question whether the possibility that a 
person may be convicted despite the existence of reasonable doubt relates to the question of 
                                                            
173The Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 
1948. 
174The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
16 December 1966. 
175 Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights is a provision of the European Convention which 
protects the right to a fair trial. 
176 Ashworth, A and Blake, M. (1996) 'The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal Law' at 133–173. 
177 Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights is also a provision of the European Convention 
which protects the right to a fair trial. 
178 Hoffmann, L.H. & Zeffertt, D.T. (1988) The South African Law of Evidence 4 ed at 534. 
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whether the impugned presumption creates a reverse burden of proof179 or an evidentiary 
burden.180  
 
(v) China 
 
China is one of those countries which are rarely considered commendable of emulation on 
issues of human rights. However, Article 12 of the new Criminal Procedure in China afforded 
recognition of the right to be presumed innocent as a fundamental principle of criminal law. 
Although Article 12 of the new Criminal Procedure does not explicitly mention the word 
“presumption of innocence,” it however provides that “no one shall be convicted unless a 
verdict of a people’s court has been reached according to law.” Moreover, article 162 of the 
new Criminal Procedure explicitly put the burden of proof on the prosecution. By 
implication, it is a common cause that the new Criminal Procedure considered the 
presumption of innocence as a fundamental concept in the administration of justice and 
elevated it to the status of a constitutional guarantee.181 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the foundational right to a fair trial is a long standing 
principle at the heart of the South African criminal justice system and has explored its 
origins, nature and scope, as well as its significance. This right is guaranteed to every accused 
person in the Republic. Central to the right to a fair trial is the notion that the accused person 
has the right to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the 
proceedings.  The right to be presumed innocent is also enshrined in various international 
human rights instruments such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights,182 the European 
                                                            
179 According to Hoffmann, L.H. & Zeffertt, D.T. (1988) The South African Law of Evidence 4 ed at 538, a 
reverse burden of proof in a criminal trial refers to a shift in the burden of proof from the State proving its case 
to an accused person to disprove the State’s case. 
180 According to Corbett J in Southern Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services 1977 
(3) SA 534 (A) at 545C-G, evidentiary burden refers to “the duty cast upon a litigant to adduce evidence in 
order to combat a prima facie case made by his opponent”. 
181 Raul, S. (2001) ‘Reverse onus Clauses: A Comparative Law Perspective’ 13 Student Advocate at 148 - 172.  
182  Article 11(1) states: “everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.” 
41 
 
Convention on Human Rights3183 and is enacted domestically in various countries, such as 
Canada, the United States of America and the United Kingdom.  
 
The right to be presumed innocent requires the criminal justice system to be biased in favour 
of presuming that the accused in criminal trials did not commit the offence. The state is 
required to bear the burden of proving the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable 
doubt. The presumption of innocence will be infringed if there is a possibility that a person 
may be convicted despite the existence of reasonable doubt.184 The presumption of innocence 
will also be infringed if the provisions of a statutory presumption require of an accused to 
establish on a balance of probabilities either an element of an offence or his or her 
innocence.185 The right to remain silent will be infringed if the accused or a suspect has been 
compelled to give self-incriminating evidence, either before or during the trial. In 
determining the constitutional implication of the presumption of guilt created by section 
235(2) of the Tax Administrative Act,186 it is therefore imperative to consider whether such 
presumption creates a reverse burden of proof or an evidentiary burden.  This is discussed in 
the next chapter.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
183  Article 6(2) states: “everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law.” 
184S v Zuma 1995 (1) SACR 568 (CC) at paragraph 25. 
185S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1995 (2) SACR 748 (CC) at paragraph 15. 
186Act 28 of 2011. 
42 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
REVERSE BURDEN OF PROOF AND EVIDENTIARY BURDEN
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will deal with the reverse burden of proof and the evidentiary burden and their 
constitutionality in South Africa. The chapter will also focus on a brief comparative study of 
the constitutionality of the reverse burden of proof and evidentiary burden in other 
jurisdictions, such as Canada, the United States of America and the United Kingdom. This 
chapter seeks to provide a clear understanding of what constitutes a reverse burden of proof 
and an evidentiary burden because the two are distinct from each other and have different 
effects upon the taxpayer’s constitutional right to a fair trial and particularly the right to be 
presumed innocent. Whether the presumption of guilt created by section 235(2) of the Tax 
Administrative Act187 constitutes a reverse burden of proof or an evidentiary burden is 
important for all legal advisors to consider before advising a taxpayer to challenge the 
constitutionality of this provision.  
 
3.2 Burden of proof in criminal trials 
 
The term ‘burden of proof’ is sometimes known as the burden of persuasion or probative 
burden.188 According to Landa and Ramjohn,189 the burden of proof refers to the legal 
obligation to prove a point in contention or a fact in issue in order to convince the judge 
during a trial. Thayer190submitted that the term ‘burden of proof’ is generally agreed to have 
been translated from the Latin maxim ei qui affirmat non ei qui negat incumbit probatio, 
which means that he who asserts a matter must prove it, but he who denies it need not prove 
it.191 In both English and South African law, a crime is proven affirmatively.192 In other 
                                                            
187Act 28 of 2011. 
188Landa, J. and Ramjohn,M. (2013). Unlocking Evidence (2ed) at 26. 
189Landa, J. and Ramjohn,M. (2013). Unlocking Evidence (2ed) at 26. 
190Thayer, J.B. (1898) A Parliamentary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law at 355.   
191 Thayer, J.B. (1898) A Parliamentary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law at 355. The same position 
has been submitted by Viscount Maugham in Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting 
Corporation Ltd [1942] AC 154, HL at 82, in which the court clearly stated that the burden of proof lies on the 
party who affirms and not upon the party who denies it. 
192S v Zuma 1995 (1) SACR 568 (CC) at paragraph 25.  
43 
 
words, it is a golden rule that the person accused of a criminal act can be only convicted after 
the case against him has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.193  
 
The golden rule that the state must prove that the accused person is guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt entails that the state must bear the onus of proof to prove every element of 
the crime alleged, including that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime, that the accused 
had the required intention, that the crime in question was committed, and that the act in 
question was unlawful.194 If the state fails to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the accused person is entitled to acquittal.195 The court in S v T196 held that: 
 
The state is required, when it tries a person for allegedly committing an 
offence, to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
high standard of proof is a core component of the fundamental right that 
every person enjoys under the Constitution and under the common law 
prior to 1994, to a fair trial. It is not part of a charter for criminals and 
neither is it a mere technicality. When a court finds that the guilt of an 
accused has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, that accused is 
entitled to an acquittal, even if there may be suspicions that he or she was, 
indeed, the perpetrator of the crime in question. That is an inevitable 
consequence of living in a society in which the freedom and the dignity of 
the individual are properly protected and are respected. The inverse 
convictions based on suspicion or speculation is the hallmark of tyrannical 
systems of law. South Africans have bitter experience of such a system and 
where it leads to. 
 
                                                            
193In R v Ndhlovu 1945 AD 369 at 386 the court stated that in all criminal cases it is for the Crown to establish 
the guilt of the accused, not for the accused to establish his innocence. The onus is on the Crown to prove all 
averments to establish his guilt. 
194 Schwikkard, PJ. and Van der Merwe, SE. (2009) Principles of Evidence (3 ed) at 313. 
195This position was set out by Nugent J in S v Van der Meyden 1999 (1) SACR 447 (W), at 448f-g: when he 
expressly stated that 
The onus of proof in a criminal case is discharged by the State if the evidence establishes 
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The corollary is that he is entitled to be 
acquitted if it is reasonably possible that he might be innocent. 
196 S v T 2005 (2) SACR 318 (E) at paragraph 37. 
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In light of the judgment of the court in in S v T,197  it is a common cause that in a criminal 
matter the accused person is not under any legal duty to prove his innocence or to disprove an 
element of an offence for which he is being charged.198 Similarly, if the plaintiff fails to prove 
negligence on the part of the defendant in an action for damages, the judgment will be given 
in favour of the defendant.199 However, the criminal standard of proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt applies only to the court‘s final evaluation of the accused’s guilt or 
innocence.200 It does not apply piecemeal to individual items of evidence submitted by the 
state.  
 
The legal burden of proof is fixed at the beginning of the trial and remains unchanged 
throughout the criminal proceedings and never shifts to the other party.201 The state is always 
obliged to prove all the elements of the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt before 
convicting the accused person.202 Similarly in civil proceedings, where the burden of proof is 
on the plaintiff or the defendant, the burden remains on him throughout the trial.203 However, 
there are well-known and recognised common law exceptions to which the general rule that 
the state must always bear a burden to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt (the “golden 
thread”) does not apply.204 According to Viscount Stanley LC in Woolmington v The DPP,205 
there are two exceptions to the “golden thread”206 namely, insanity and any express statutory 
exception.207 Where the accused person raises the defence of insanity,208 the burden is on him 
                                                            
197 S v T 2005 (2) SACR 318 (E) at paragraph 37. 
198 In S v Mhlongo 1991 (2) SACR 207 (A), at 210d-f the court noted that the onus rests is on the state to prove 
the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, no onus rests on the accused to prove his or her innocence. The  
same point was enunciated by Zulman JA in S v V  2000 (1) SACR 453 (SCA), at paragraph 3(i) when he stated 
that  
‘It is trite that there is no obligation upon an accused person, “to convince the court”. If his 
version is reasonably possibly true he is entitled to his acquittal even though his 
explanation is improbable. A court is not entitled to convict unless it is satisfied not only 
that the explanation is improbable but that beyond any reasonable doubt it is false. ..” 
199Schwikkard, PJ. and Van der Merwe, SE. (2009) Principles of Evidence (3 ed) at 313. 
200Lord Sankey in the English locus classicus of Woolmington v The DPP [1935] A.C. 462 at 481. 
201 Woolmington v The DPP [1935] A.C. 462 at 240. 
202 R v Difford 1937 AD 370 at 373 and 383.    
203 Schwikkard, PJ. and Van der Merwe, SE. (2009) Principles of Evidence (3 ed) at 315. 
204 Bennion, F. (1988). 'Statutory Exceptions: A Third Knot in the Golden Thread?' Criminal Law Review, vol 
31at 44-88. 
205 Woolmington v The DPP [1935] A.C. 462. 
206 The general rule that the state must always bears a burden to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 
207 Where a statute places the legal burden of proof on the defendant. 
208 In theory, the definition of insanity means that whether a defect of reason led him or her not to know the 
nature or quality of his or her act, or that the act was wrong, or the defect of reason did not have that effect.  
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to prove this submission on a balance of probabilities.209 Another exception to the “golden 
thread” occurs where a statute provides for it.210 Statutory provisions may expressly or by 
implication place the burden of proof on the accused. This normally happens through judicial 
interpretation of the statute. Implied statutory exceptions usually arise where legislation 
prohibits “the doing of an act subject to exceptions.” In this instance, the burden of proof 
rests on the accused person to prove that he falls within the exception.211 
  
Although Viscount Stanley LC in Woolmington v The DPP212 only articulated two exceptions 
to the “golden thread”.213  A third exception has been added. The third exception is that the 
“golden thread” will not apply where the alleged facts are within the knowledge of one party.  
According to Mthembu,214 this exception does not apply in proving negligence. In Union 
Government (Minister of Railways) v Sykes,215 the plaintiff sued the Minister of Railways for 
damage to his land caused by a fire started by sparks from a railway engine. It was alleged 
that the railway spark arrestor was not in working order. This submission was a fact which 
was within the knowledge of the defendant's servants only. As a result, they bore the onus of 
proving that it was in fact working. However, the court rejected this argument, saying that it 
was settled law that the burden of proving negligence rested on the plaintiff and that no 
variation in the facts could alter this rule. In South Africa, the only exception to the “golden 
thread” that has been accepted by courts is that of insanity.216 
 
 
                                                            
209Lord Viscount Sankey LC in Woolmington v The DPP [1935] A.C. 462 at 340 said:  
“Where intent is an ingredient of a crime, there is no onus on the defendant to prove that 
the act alleged was accidental. Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one 
golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the 
prisoner's guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence of insanity….”  
210 Zuckerman, A. (1976),'The Third Exception to the Woolmington Rule', 92 Law Quarterly Review  at 402-
426 
211 Fennell, C. (2003).The Law of Evidence, (2nd ed) at 45. 
212 Woolmington v The DPP [1935] A.C. 462 . 
213 The  general rule that the state must always bears a burden to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 
214  Mthembu, MH.(1998) ‘The constitutionality of presumptions in South African law’, The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa, Vol. 31 at  213-227. 
215 Union Government (Minister of Railways) v Sykes 1913 AD 156. 
216 Mthembu, MH.(1998) ‘The constitutionality of presumptions in South African law’, The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa, Vol. 31 at  213-227. 
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3.3 Reverse burden of proof 
A reverse burden of proof in a criminal matter refers to a shift in the burden of proof from the 
state to the accused.  According to Hoffmann and Zeffertt,217 there is a significant distinction 
between a reverse burden of proof and an evidentiary burden. The two must therefore not be 
confused or used interchangeably. The difference between a reverse burden of proof and an 
evidentiary burden can be construed by looking at the language in which a presumption is 
cast.218 In determining whether the impugned presumption creates a reverse burden of proof 
or a mere evidentiary burden, the words “shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved”, 
indicates that a reverse burden of proof has been created.219 
The effect of reverse burden of proof is that the accused will be placed under a legal 
obligation to prove some matter which shows that he is not guilty of an offence.220  As 
articulated by the court in S v Zuma,221 the Constitutional right to be presumed innocent will 
be infringed by the existence of the reverse burden of proof. This has been confirmed by 
Ngcobo J222 in S v Singo223  in which he pronounced that:  
 
A provision which imposes a legal burden on the accused constitutes a 
radical departure from our law, which requires the state to establish the 
guilt of the accused and not the accused to establish his or her innocence. 
That fundamental principle of our law is now firmly entrenched in s 35(3) 
(h) of the Constitution which provides that an accused person has the right 
to be presumed innocent. What makes a provision which imposes a legal 
burden constitutionally objectionable is that it permits an accused to be 
convicted in spite of the existence of a reasonable doubt. 
 
                                                            
217 Hoffmann, L.H. &Zeffertt, D.T. (1988) The South African Law of Evidence 4 ed at 534.  
218 Mthembu, MH. (1998) ‘The constitutionality of presumptions in South African law’, The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa, Vol. 31 at 213-227. 
219Hoffmann, L.H. & Zeffertt, D.T. (1988) The South African Law of Evidence 4 ed at 534. 
220  Dennis, I. (2005). 'Reverse Onuses and the Presumption of Innocence: In Search of Principle', Criminal Law 
Review 901-936, at 901. 
221S v Zuma,1995 (1) SACR 568 (CC) at paragraph 25. 
222 S v Singo 2002 (4) SA 858 CC.  
223 S v Singo 2002 (4) SA 858 CC. 
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The importance of the above judgment is that it clearly emphasizes that the reverse burden of 
proof has the effect of forcing the accused person to give evidence, thus impinging upon his 
right to remain silent as entrenched by section 35 of the Constitution.224 
 
3.3.1 Justification for the reverse burden of proof 
 
The court in S v Zuma225 and S v Singo226 held that the existence of reverse burden of proof in 
the South African law infringes the fundamental principles of the presumption of innocence 
and the right to remain silent, which is now firmly rooted in section 35(3) of the Constitution. 
However, the existence of a reverse burden of proof in the South African law has been based 
on two main premises:  
 
(i) That the facts are within the knowledge of the accused person only. In 
this regard, the state will not be able to prove its case against the accused 
without the assistance of the presumption.  
 
(ii) There is practical difficulty of proving a negative where the other party 
denies a negative proposition. It has been suggested,227 that this problem 
can be solved by placing reverse burden of proof upon the party who 
denies a negative proposition. 
 
3.4 Evidentiary burden  
 
As mentioned earlier, the wording of the impugned presumption is of paramount significance 
in determining whether or not such a presumption creates an evidentiary burden or a reverse 
burden of proof. The words “is prima facie evidence” indicates that only an evidentiary 
burden of proof has been created by the impugned presumption.228 According to 
                                                            
224 Section 25(3) of the Interim Constitution of 1993 and section 35(3)(h) of the 1996 Constitution. 
225S v Zuma,1995 (1) SACR 568 (CC) at paragraph 25. 
226 S v Singo 2002 (4) SA 858 CC. 
227 Mthembu, MH. (1998) ‘The constitutionality of presumptions in South African law’, The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa, Vol. 31 at 213-227. 
228 Ashworth, A. (2006) ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ 123 SALJ 63 at 89. 
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Schwikkard,229 an evidentiary burden refers to the duty placed on the accused to produce 
sufficient ‘prima facie’ evidence before the court for a judge to call the plaintiff to answer. In 
other words, evidentiary burden encourages parties to lead enough evidence to make out a 
case that is sufficiently strong to create a risk for the opponent. Unlike the reverse burden of 
proof, an evidentiary burden does not create the possibility of conviction, despite the 
existence of a reasonable doubt.230 Normally, an evidentiary burden is discharged in the 
following ways: calling witnesses, showing video or photograph evidence, tendering 
documentary evidence, adducing items of real evidence or producing expert opinion 
evidence. If the opponent does nothing against the evidence led against them, they would lose 
the case. 
 
According to Corbett J in Southern Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management 
Services,231 an evidentiary burden refers to “the duty cast upon a litigant to adduce evidence 
in order to combat a prima facie case made by his opponent”. From the definition of an 
evidentiary burden provided by Corbett J, it is a common cause that the evidentiary burden 
can rest on either side in a trial. For example, at the onset of the trial,232 the evidentiary 
burden usually rests on the party seeking to establish their case. Once that party has 
succeeded in establishing a case, the evidentiary burden shifts to the other party to lead 
enough evidence to rebut the case established against him or her. The rationale for placing the 
evidentiary burden on the accused is to establish whether or not sufficient reason exists to 
expend judicial resources on litigation in any particular case.233 
 
3.5 The constitutionality of the reverse burden of proof 
It is imperative to commence by providing a general analysis and discussion of the 
constitutionality of reverse onus provisions and presumptions as applied in other branches of 
                                                            
229Schwikkard, PJ. and Van der Merwe, SE. (2009) Principles of Evidence (3 ed) at 502 submit that where it is 
stated that evidence of fact constitutes ‘prima facie proof of’, or ‘prima facie evidence of’, then only an 
evidentiary burden is created.  
230 Ashworth, A. (2006) ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ 123 SALJ 63 at 89 submits, however, 
that ‘discharging the evidential burden does place an obligation on the defendant, and for that reason it requires 
justification and should not be casually imposed. But it is much lighter than the burden of proving an issue on 
the balance of probabilities, and hence it is less objectionable, certainly as a means of dealing with offences to 
which various possible defences may be raised and where it would clearly be inappropriate to expect the 
prosecution to negative all of them if the defendant did not wish to rely on some of them.’ 
231Southern Cape Corporation Ltd v Engineering Management Services ( Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 534 (A) at 548. 
232Southern Cape Corporation Ltd v Engineering Management Services ( Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 534 (A) at 548. 
233 Mthembu, MH.(1998) ‘The constitutionality of presumptions in South African law’, The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa, Vol. 31 at  213-227.  
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law and particularly in South African criminal law and the law of insolvency. This will 
contribute to keeping the goals of this study in focus. 
 
3.5.1 Reverse onus provisions and presumptions in the South African law of insolvency 
 
The Insolvency Act234 creates several criminal offences in connection with Insolvency.235  
Section 146 of the Act236 provides that: 
 
 
Whenever in any criminal proceedings under this Act any liability incurred 
by an insolvent is in issue, proof that a claim in respect of that liability has 
been admitted against the estate of the insolvent in accordance with any 
provision of this Act shall be sufficient evidence of the existence of the 
liability and any such liability shall be deemed to have been incurred upon 
the date or at the time alleged in any document submitted in accordance 
with any provision of this Act in support of that claim: Provided that the 
accused in those proceedings may prove that no such liability was incurred 
or that it was incurred on a date other than the date so alleged. 
 
In accordance with the above presumption, upon proof that there is a claim in respect of 
liability that has been admitted against the estate of the insolvent, that liability shall be 
presumed to have been incurred upon the date and at the time alleged, unless the accused 
insolvent can prove that no such liability was incurred or that it was incurred on a date other 
than the date so alleged. The implication of this presumption is that the accused insolvent is 
under a legal duty to prove that ‘no such liability was incurred or that it was incurred on a 
date other than the date so alleged’. Failure to so prove, has the consequence that the 
insolvent person shall be presumed to have incurred the liability in question. This provision 
raises a constitutional concern whether or not it unjustifiably infringes the right to a fair trial 
and particularly, the right to remain silent as guaranteed in terms of section 35 of the 
                                                            
234 Act 24 of 1936.  
235 According to Venter v Volkskas Ltd 1973 (3) SA 175 (T) defined insolvency as a situation when debtor’s 
liabilities (fairly valued) exceed his assets (fairly valued). It is important to note that the court in Realizations 
Ltd v Ager 1961 (4) SA 10 (D) at 11-12 held that proof of an inability to pay debts is only prima facie evidence 
of insolvency not necessarily insolvency. 
236 Act 24 of 1936. 
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Constitution.  According to Winsen JA237 in Ensor NO v New Mayfair Hotel,238 by placing 
the accused insolvent under a legal obligation to prove that ‘no such liability was incurred or 
that it was incurred on a date other than the date so alleged’, the impugned provision created 
a ‘reverse onus of proof’ which infringes upon the accused insolvent’s right to a free trial. 
The  court went further and held that the constitutional validity of this ‘reverse onus’ 
presumption will depend upon whether its limitation of the accused’s right to a fair trial is 
regarded as reasonable and justifiable in terms of  section 36(1) of the Constitution.  
Consequently the court held that the presumption was indeed justified in terms of section 
36(1) of the Constitution. From this judgment, it can be submitted that in the case of the 
South African law of Insolvency the reverse onus clauses are considered to be 
unconstitutional unless they are saved by the limitation clause embodied in section 36(1) of 
the Constitution. 
 
3.5.2 Reverse onus provisions and presumptions in the South African criminal law 
 
The first matter involving the constitutionality of a reverse burden of proof in South Africa 
has been considered by the Constitutional court in S v Zuma.239  In this case, the court had to 
decide upon the constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act which 
provides that where a confession by an accused person has been made to a magistrate or has 
been reduced to writing in the presence of a magistrate, it shall be admissible in evidence 
against the accused. Further provided by the sub-paragraphs of this section is that the 
confession shall be presumed to have been freely and voluntarily made by the accused in his 
or her sound and sober senses and without having been unduly influenced, unless the contrary 
is proved.  The phrase “unless the contrary is proved” which was used in the provision meant, 
in effect, that if the accused failed to discharge the burden of proof, that is, on a balance of 
probabilities, the confession would be admitted notwithstanding the existence of a reasonable 
doubt that it had been made freely and voluntarily. In deciding the matter, Kentridge J 
adopted the two principles laid down by Cory J in the Canadian case of R v Downey240 
                                                            
237 Ensor NO v New Mayfair Hotel 1968 (4) SA 462 (N) at 467. 
238 Ensor NO v New Mayfair Hotel 1968 (4) SA 462 (N). 
239S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
240R v Downey 1992 90 DLR 45h at 449 where the SCA held that a statutory presumption that “a person who 
lives with, or is habitually in the company of prostitutes is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
committing the offence of ‘living on the avails, that is, proceeds of another person's prostitution” was also held 
to infringe the presumption of innocence embodied in section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter. The presumption 
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namely: (1) the presumption of innocence will be infringed whenever there is a possibility of 
conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt, and (2) where the statutory 
presumption requires the accused to prove or disapprove an element of the offence on the 
balance of probabilities. Consequently, Kentridge J held that the presumption created by 
section 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act was unconstitutional because it breached 
the constitutional right to be presumed innocent. However, the court emphasized that this 
judgement did not establish that all statutory provisions that create a reasonable presumption 
of guilt in criminal matters are constitutionally invalid. In other words, each case is unique 
and hence it must be considered on its own facts and merits. In essence, a reverse onus or 
presumption of guilt provision would be constitutionally valid, especially in those matters 
where there is a pressing social need for the effective prosecution of a crime. 
  
In S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso241 the court dealt with the matter concerning the 
constitutionality of a reverse burden of proof. The matter in this case concerned section 
21(1)(a)(i) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act which provides that if an accused has been 
found in possession of more than 115 grams of dagga, he or she will be presumed to have 
been dealing in dagga and will be convicted of the offence of dealing unless that person 
proves that he or she has not been dealing in dagga. The court had to decide whether or not 
this provision infringes upon the right of an accused person to be presumed innocent in terms 
of section 25(3)(c) of the interim Constitution. O’Regan J242 found that the effect of section 
21(1)(a)(i) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act  is to create a presumption which relieves 
the prosecution from proving that the accused has been dealing in dagga, which could result 
in the conviction of an accused person despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or 
her guilt. In other words, if the accused failed to prove on a preponderance of probabilities 
that he or she was not dealing or trafficking in dagga, a conviction for dealing would result, 
even if the evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to the innocence of such accused. 
Consequently, the court held that the impugned provision is in breach of the presumption of 
innocence and therefore offends against section 25(3)(c) of the Constitution. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
of innocence protected by section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter bears a close relationship to the presumption of 
innocence in the South African Constitution. 
241S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC); 1995 (12) BCLR 1579 (CC) . 
242 S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC); 1995 (12) BCLR 1579 (CC) at paragraph 15.  
52 
 
The constitutionality of a reverse burden of proof has also been considered in S v Mbatha; S v 
Prinsloo.243 The applicants in both cases challenged the constitutionality of section 40(1) of 
the Arms and Ammunitions Act244 which provided that:  
 
Whenever in any prosecution for being in possession of any article contrary 
to the provisions of this Act, it is proved that such article has at any time 
been on or in any premises, any person who at that time was on or in or in 
charge of or present at or occupying such premises, shall be presumed to 
have been in possession of that article at that time, until the contrary is 
proved. 
 
To support its case, the state submitted two main averments. The first submission was that 
crime levels are constantly accelerating at an alarming rate. The high levels of crime were 
perpetuated by the explosion of illegal arms and ammunition. In this regard, the presumption 
of guilt of those found in possession of illegal arms and ammunition assisted in fighting the 
rising levels of crime by ensuring effective policing. The second submission by the state was 
that high crime levels have a deep, negative effect on the quality of life in communities and 
are a threat to social stability.   
 
The court considered the wording of the presumption and acknowledged that the presumption 
of guilt would be a solution to the difficulties faced by the police in investigating crime of 
illegal arms and ammunition. However, the court emphasised that the presumption was too 
widely phrased. Its effect was to create a 'reverse-onus' because it shifted the burden of proof 
of guilt away from the state to the accused to disprove the presumed fact of 'possession' on a 
balance of probabilities. This meant that even if the accused established a reasonable doubt, 
he or she could still be convicted for failing to disprove the presumed fact on a balance of 
probabilities. Consequently the court came to the conclusion that impugned presumption 
infringed the right of an accused person to be presumed innocent.245 The court went further to 
consider whether the infringement caused by section 40(1) of the Arms and Ammunitions 
Act could be justified in terms of section 33 of the Interim Constitution (now section 36 of 
the Constitution). The court held that the state failed to show that the objective of the 
                                                            
243 S v Mbatha, S v Prinsloo 1996 (3) BCLR 293. 
244 Act 75 of 1969. 
245 S v Mbatha, S v Prinsloo 1996 (3) BCLR 293 at 386. 
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impugned presumption, namely to facilitate the conviction of offenders, could not be 
reasonably achieved by other means which are less damaging to constitutionally entrenched 
rights.246 Accordingly, Langa J247 held that the impugned presumption of guilt was 
inconsistent with the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom 
and equality hence it cannot be said to be justifiable.  
 
Mello and another v S248 is also an important case in as far as the constitutionality of a 
reverse burden of proof in criminal matters is concerned. The appellants, with two other 
persons, stood trial in the Pretoria Magistrate's Court on charges of possession of dagga in 
contravention of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act.249 The evidence established that 
several packages of dagga were found hidden in various parts of a truck driven by one of the 
accused and in which the other accused were passengers. The appellants and one other 
accused were found guilty and convicted.  In convicting them, the magistrate relied on the 
presumption created by section 20 of the Act which provides that “If in the prosecution of 
any person for an offence under this Act it is proved that any drug was found in the 
immediate vicinity of the accused, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the 
accused was found in possession of such drug”. The appellants approached the constitutional 
court challenging the constitutionality of the presumption created by section 20 of the Drugs 
and Drug Trafficking Act. The Constitutional Court held that such presumption places a 
reverse onus on accused to disprove an essential element of offence. Failure to do so, even 
where reasonable doubt exists, would result in conviction, which offends against right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty. Consequently, the court held that section 20 of the 
Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act is not justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality and hence it is unconstitutional. 
 
3.6 The constitutionality of the evidentiary burden 
 
The matter involving the constitutionality of the evidentiary burden in the South African law 
was decided by the constitutional court in Scagell v Attorney-General of the Western Cape.250 
                                                            
246 S v Mbatha, S v Prinsloo 1996 (3) BCLR 293 at 308 
247S v Mbatha, S v Prinsloo 1996 (3) BCLR 293 at 306. 
248 Mello and another v S  1998 (7) BCLR 908 (CC). 
249 Act 140 of 1992. 
250Scagell v Attorney-General of the Western Cape 1996 11 BCLR 1446 (CC) at paragraph 11. 
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In this case, the applicants were jointly charged in the Cape Town Magistrates’ Court with 
having permitted the playing of a gambling game in breach of section 6(1) of the Gambling 
Act. Section 6 of the Gambling Act provides that: no person shall permit the playing of any 
gambling game at any place under his control or in his charge and no person shall play any 
such game at any place or visit any place with the object of playing any such game. An 
accused is presumed to have permitted the playing of a gambling game at a place over which 
he or she is in control or in charge, in circumstances where a member of the police force is 
wilfully prevented from, or obstructed or delayed in, entering the place. The court was 
concerned with the question of whether not section 6 of the Gambling Act251 was consistent 
with section 25(3) of the Interim Constitution which provides for the right to a fair trial and, 
more particularly, section 25(3)(c) which provides the accused the right to be presumed 
innocent and the right to remain silent. O’Regan J252 held that:  
 
The words “shall be prima facie evidence” used in section 6(3) of the 
Gambling Act were generally considered as imposing no more than an 
evidentiary burden on the accused. Such an evidentiary burden merely 
requires “evidence sufficient to give rise to a reasonable doubt to prevent 
conviction”.253  
 
It was held further by the court that, unlike the imposition of a legal burden, an evidentiary 
burden did not create the possibility of conviction despite the existence of a reasonable 
doubt.”254 The importance of the judgment by O’Regan J in the South African law is that the 
evidentiary burden does not place a burden of proof on the accused to disprove an element of 
an offence on a balance of probabilities, hence it does not violate the accused’s right to a fair 
trial, particularly the right to be presumed innocent and the right to remain silent. 
 
S v Singo255 is another instructive case in as far as the constitutionality of the reverse burden 
of proof and evidentiary burden provisions are concerned. In this case, Mr Singo was warned 
by the magistrate to appear in court on 17 January 1997 on charges of common assault and 
                                                            
251 Act 51 of 1965. 
252 Scagell v Attorney-General of the Western Cape 1996 11 BCLR 1446 (CC) at paragraph 16. 
253Scagell v Attorney-General of the Western Cape 1996 11 BCLR 1446 (CC) at paragraph 12. 
254Scagell v Attorney-General of the Western Cape 1996 11 BCLR 1446 (CC) at paragraph 16. 
255 S v Singo (CCT49/01) [2002] ZACC 10. 
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malicious damage to property.256 He did not comply with the warning.257 His reason for 
failure to appear in court was that he had settled the underlying dispute with the complainant 
and that they had become reconciled. They had agreed that both would appear in court on 17 
January 1997 in order to have the charges withdrawn.258 However, owing to a 
misunderstanding on his part, he did not appear before the court, he went to work. Thereafter, 
he was sent to Namibia.259 His explanation was rejected by the Magistrate who invoked the 
provisions of section 72(4)260 of the Criminal Procedure Act261 which provides for the 
imposition of a fine or imprisonment if the accused person fails to appear in court at the time 
and on the date fixed by a warning so to appear, unless the accused can show the court that 
the failure was not due to his or her fault. Consequently, Mr Singo was convicted, and 
sentenced to three months imprisonment without an option of a fine in the High Court.262 Mr 
Singo approached the Constitutional Court challenging the provisions of section 72(4) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act263 arguing that the imposition of a fine or imprisonment provided by 
section 72(4) limits his constitutional right to a fair trial, particularly the right to be presumed 
innocent and the right to remain silent. 
 
The Constitutional Court was faced with three main legal issues namely, whether the 
imposition of a fine or imprisonment envisaged in section 72(4) limits the right to a fair trial, 
more particularly, whether the phrase “unless such accused or such person satisfies the court 
that his failure was not due to fault on his part” limits the right to be presumed innocent and 
the right to remain silent.  Secondly, if the right to a fair trial is limited, the court had to 
decide whether such limitation is justifiable under section 36(1) of the Constitution. Lastly, if 
                                                            
256 Scagell v Attorney-General of the Western Cape 1996 11 BCLR 1446 (CC) para 4 
257 S v Singo (CCT49/01) [2002] ZACC 10 para 4. 
258 S v Singo (CCT49/01) [2002] ZACC 10 para 4. 
259 S v Singo (CCT49/01) [2002] ZACC 10 para 4. 
260 Section 72(4) provides: 
The court may, if satisfied that an accused referred to in subsection (2)(a) or a person referred 
to in subsection (2)(b), was duly warned in terms of paragraph (a) or, as the case may be, 
paragraph (b) of subsection (1), and that such accused or such person has failed to comply 
with such warning or to comply with a condition imposed, issue a warrant for his arrest, and 
may, when he is brought before the court, in a summary manner enquire into his failure and, 
unless such accused or such person satisfies the court that his failure was not due to fault on 
his part, sentence him to a fine not exceeding R300 or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding three months.” 
 
261 Act 51 of 1977. 
262 S v Singo (CCT49/01) [2002] ZACC 10 at paragraph 4. 
263 Act 51 of 1977.  
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any of the limitations imposed by section 72(4) is not justifiable, what the appropriate relief 
is.   With regard to the first issue, the court held that section 72(4) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act264 imposes a legal burden of proof on an accused which means that the accused is 
required to disprove fault, which is an element of the offence charged. The implication of this 
is that the accused is liable to be convicted and forced to give evidence, thus impinging upon 
his right to remain silent. To support its case, the state submitted that the infringement 
imposed by section 72(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act265 was justifiable in terms of section 
36 of the Constitution due to the need for effective prosecution of conduct that hinders the 
administration of justice. It was further submitted by the state that failing to effectively secure 
the accused’s appearance in court would result in the public losing confidence in the system 
of criminal justice.266However, the Constitutional Court held that the importance of dealing 
effectively with conduct that obstructs the administration of justice justified the intrusion into 
the right to silence, but did not justify the legal burden of proof imposed on an accused which 
requires a conviction despite the existence of reasonable doubt, nor the limitation of the 
presumption of innocence that went with it.267 The Court found section 72(4) to be 
inconsistent with the Constitution and consequently ordered words to be read into the 
section.268  
 
From the discussion above, it is apparent that a reverse burden of proof in a criminal trial 
refers to a shift in the burden of proof from the state proving its case to an accused person 
having to disprove the state’s case269, whilst the evidentiary burden refers to the duty placed 
on the accused to produce sufficient ‘prima facie’ evidence before the court for a judge to call 
upon the plaintiff to answer. The practical implication of a reverse burden of proof or a 
presumption of guilt provision is that the accused person is required to prove or disprove one 
element of the offence. This creates a possibility that the accused could be found guilty of a 
crime, despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt. Consequently, South 
African courts have regarded the reverse burden of proof and presumption of guilt provision 
as unconstitutional on the basis that they infringe upon the accused’s a right to fair trial and, 
                                                            
264 Act 51 of 1977. 
265 Act 51 of 1977.  
266 S v Singo (CCT49/01) [2002] ZACC 10 para 37. 
267 S v Singo (CCT49/01) [2002] ZACC 10 para 37. 
268 S v Singo (CCT49/01) [2002] ZACC 10 para 42. 
269Mthembu, MH.(1998) ‘The constitutionality of presumptions in South African law’, The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa, Vol. 31 at  213-227. 
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particularly, the right to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the 
proceedings. Unlike the imposition of a legal burden, an evidentiary burden does not create 
the possibility of conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. Consequently, South 
African courts have regarded statutory presumptions that impose an evidentiary burden on the 
accused person to be constitutional. 
 
3.7 The constitutionality of the reverse burden of proof and evidentiary burden in other 
jurisdictions 
 
(iv) The United Kingdom 
 
Unlike South Africa, the United Kingdom has no a written constitution embodying 
fundamental human rights.270 However, it would be unrealistic to consider that the citizens of 
a democratic state such as the United Kingdom have no guarantees safeguarding their 
individual liberties.271  The European Convention on Human Rights became part of British 
law under the Human Rights Act272 in 1998.  This means that, for the first time, the 
presumption of innocence was expressly guaranteed by British law. As a result, it is possible 
for the courts to challenge the constitutionality of reverse onus clauses on the grounds that 
they infringe the accused’s right to be presumed innocent.  
 
Keogh v R273 is one of the major United Kingdom cases in which the United Kingdom Court 
of Appeal had to consider the constitutionality of both the reverse burden of proof and 
evidentiary burden. In this case, the accused acquired possession of highly confidential 
information from a meeting between the British Prime Minister and the President of the 
United States of America in relation to their political, diplomatic and defence policies in Iraq. 
The document containing the confidential information from the meeting subsequently found 
its way into the possession of a Member of Parliament. The accused was charged with 
breaching the Official Secrets Act, which makes it an offence to make a damaging disclosure 
of information, documents or articles relating to defence or international relations without 
lawful authority. In terms of section 2 and 3 of the Official Secrets Act, it is for the accused 
                                                            
270 Mthembu, MH.(1998) ‘The constitutionality of presumptions in South African ,Vol. 31 at  213-227.  
271 Mthembu, MH.(1998) ‘The constitutionality of presumptions in South African ,Vol. 31 at  213-227. 
272 The Human Rights Act 1998. 
273 Keogh v R [2007] EWCA Crim 528. 
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to prove that, at the time of the alleged offence, he did not know, or had no reasonable cause 
to believe, that disclosure of the information would be damaging. The accused argued that 
this provision was of no force and effect because it infringes upon his right to be presumed 
innocent as envisaged by Article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights274 which 
provides for the accused’s right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 
 
In deciding this matter, the court distinguished between a reverse burden of proof and an 
“evidential” burden by observing that an evidential burden of proof requires the accused to 
adduce sufficient evidence to raise an issue before the court. As such, the court concluded 
that evidential burdens does not breach the presumption of innocence provided in Article 6(2) 
of the European Convention of Human Rights. The court also observed that the reverse 
burden of proof requires the accused to prove, on a balance of probabilities, a fact which is 
essential to the determination of his guilt or innocence. In this regard, the Court of Appeal 
noted that section 2 and 3 of the Official Secrets Act requires the accused to prove that “he 
did not know, or had no reasonable cause to believe, that disclosure of the information would 
be damaging” in order  to establish that he is not guilty. Consequently, the court held that 
sections 2 and 3 of the Official Secrets Act conflict with the presumption of innocence 
required by Article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights. The prosecution 
submitted that the infringement on the presumption of innocence was justifiable because it 
would be too onerous a task for the prosecutor to disprove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the 
accused did know or believe that the disclosure of the document would be damaging and that 
it was reasonable to require the accused to prove his own state of mind. The court rejected 
this averment and pronounced that the reverse burden of proof is not a necessary element in 
the effective operation of sections 2 and 3 of the Official Secrets Act and therefore placing 
such a burden on the appellant cannot be justified. 
 
In light of the above case, it is a common cause that in the United Kingdom, the courts have 
regarded a statutory presumption that imposes an evidentiary burden on the accused to be 
constitutional because such presumption does not create the possibility of conviction despite 
the existence of a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, reverse onus clauses (presumptions of 
guilt provisions) have been regarded as being unconstitutional on the basis that it infringes 
                                                            
274 Article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights provides that “everyone charged with a criminal 
offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”. 
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the presumption of innocence required by Article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human 
Rights unless they are justifiable by a legitimate purpose.  
 
(v) Canada. 
 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for the protection of the right to be 
presumed innocent until guilt has been proven by the court.275 R v Downey276 is one of the 
most celebrated Canadian cases in which the Canadian Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of a statutory presumption created by section 195(2) of Criminal Code. The 
accused was jointly charged with his companion, with two counts of living on the avails of 
prostitution. Section 195(2) of Criminal Code provides that evidence that a person lives in the 
company of prostitutes, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is regarded as proof that the 
person lives on the avails of prostitution.  The accused argued that section 95(2) of the Code was 
of no force because it violates his right to be presumed innocent, as guaranteed by section 11(d) 
of the Charter. The court examined the wording of the impugned presumption and observed 
that it infringes upon the right to be presumed innocent since it could result in the conviction of 
the accused despite the existence of a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge as to his 
guilt.  The court noted that the fact that someone lives with a prostitute does not lead inexorably 
to the conclusion that the person is living on the avails of prostitution. Consequently, it was 
concluded that section 195(2) was incompatible with the Canadian constitutional values, 
particularly the the presumption of innocence embodied in section 11(d) of the Canadian 
Charter.277 The second question addressed by the court in this case was whether or not the 
infringement posed by section 195(2) of Criminal Code upon the accused’s right to be 
presumed innocent can be justified under section 1 of the Charter.278 In terms of section 1 of 
the Charter, the rights and freedoms which it guarantees are “subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. In 
this regard, the court stated that section 195(2) must be viewed in the context of section 195. 
The court pointed out that the majority of offences outlined in section 195(1) are aimed at those 
who entice or encourage a person to engage in prostitution. Section 195(1)(j) is specifically 
                                                            
275 Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
276R v Downey 1992 90 DLR 45h 449. 
277 Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter provides that any person charged with an offence has the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal. 
278 This test was established by Dickson CJC in R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 at 223.  
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aimed at those who have an economic stake in the earnings of a prostitute  along with customers.  
In this regard, the court held that the presumption created by 195(2) of Criminal Code plays a 
legitimate role in assisting in curbing the exploitive activity of pimps, in attempting to deal with 
a cruel and pervasive social evil. Consequently, the court concluded that the infringement posed 
by section 195(2) of Criminal Code upon the accused’s right to be presumed innocent is 
justifiable under section 1 of the Charter.  
 
R v Whyte,279 is another Canadian case in which the constitutionality of a reverse onus 
provision has been considered. The accused was arrested whilst sitting on the driver’s seat in 
a drunken state. He was charged under section  237(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and upon 
proof that the accused occupied the driver's seat in a drunken state, he will be deemed to have 
had the care and control of the vehicle, unless he established that he did not enter the vehicle 
for the purpose of setting it in motion. The accused challenged this provision on the grounds 
that it infringes his right to be presumed innocent provided by section 11(d) of the Charter. In 
deciding the constitutional implication of this statute, Dickson CJC 280 stated that: 
An excuse or a defense should not affect the analysis of the presumption of 
innocence. It is the final effect of a provision on the verdict that is decisive. 
If an accused is required to prove some fact on the balance of probabilities 
to avoid conviction, the provision violates the presumption of innocence 
because it permits a conviction in spite of considerable doubt in the mind of 
the trier of fact as to the guilt of the accused.  
Accordingly, the court held that the effect of section 237(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is that 
the accused is required on the balance of probabilities to prove lack of intention to set the 
vehicle in motion to avoid conviction. Failure to do so would merit a conviction of the 
accused in spite of a reasonable doubt in the mind of a judge as to his guilt. For that reason, 
section 237(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was held to be a violation of the right to be presumed 
innocent embodied in section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter.281 The court went further to 
consider whether or not the infringement caused by section 237(1)(a) of the Criminal Code 
                                                            
279 R v Whyte 1988 5 1 DLR 4th 481 (SCC). 
280 R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200, at 223.  
281 Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11) provides that any person charged with an offence has the 
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal. 
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on the right to be presumed innocent can be justified under section 1 of the Charter.282 The 
court  held that section 237(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was propagated to stamp out the 
seriousness of drinking and driving, which makes it  makes it justified under section 1 of 
Charter. 
 
(vi) The United States of America 
 
Tot v United States,283 is the first case relevant to the investigation of presumptions in the 
American jurisdiction. In this case, Frank Tot (the accused), was convicted and sentenced for 
violation of section 2(f) of the Federal Firearms Act, by which it was made unlawful for any 
person who has been convicted of a crime of violence to receive any firearm or ammunition 
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. The accused had 
previously been convicted of a crime of violence. The accused argued that by placing on him 
the burden of producing the facts which establish that a mere possession of firearms does not 
indicate that the acquisition was in an interstate transaction, the impugned provision violated 
his presumption of innocence. The court examined the impugned provision and Justice 
Roberts284 held that the presumption of guilt created by section 2(f) of the Federal Firearms 
Act requires the accused to prove his innocence and hence it violates the fundamental concept 
that a man is innocent until proved guilty. To support its case, the prosecution submitted that 
the infringement in question caused by section 2(f) of the Federal Firearms Act was 
reasonable and justifiable because this provision sought to achieve a legitimate social end. 
The prosecution argued that the social end sought to be achieved by this legislation was the 
protection of society against violent men armed with dangerous weapons, which would be 
fundamental for the existence of an organized nation. The court recognized the protection of 
society against violent armed men as a legitimate social end but questioned whether there was 
any rational connection between the facts proved and the facts presumed. On the basis of this, 
the court held that there is no a reasonable connection between the facts proved (mere 
possession of firearms) and the fact presumed (that firearms were acquired in an interstate 
transaction). In other words, the court was not convinced that the intended purpose (to protect 
the society against violent armed men) will be served by the impugned presumption of guilt. 
                                                            
282 In terms of section 1 of the Charter, the rights and freedoms which it guarantees are “subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. 
283Tot v United States 1943 319 All ER 463. 
284 Tot v United States 1943 319 All ER 463 at 216. 
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Therefore section 2(f) of the Federal Firearms Act was regarded as unconstitutional and was 
struck down. 
 
Leary v United States285 is another case in which the constitutionality of a reverse onus 
provision has been considered. In this case, Dr. Leary accompanied by his two children and 
another two people left New York by a car to Mexico for a Christmas vacation. Dr Leary and 
the four passengers drove across the international boundary into the Republic of Mexico and 
turned back toward the United States. Along the way, they met a United States inspector. The 
inspector asked the group if they had anything to declare from Mexico and was told that they 
had nothing. However, the inspector observed some vegetable-like material and a seed on the 
floor of the car which appeared to him to be marihuana. A search of the vehicle and 
individuals was made. Sweepings from the car floor later proved to be marihuana. Thus the 
five travelers were arrested. In terms of the Marijuana Tax Act, possession of marijuana was 
deemed to be sufficient evidence of the offence of illegal importation, unless the accused 
explained his possession to the satisfaction of the jury. On the basis of this provision, the 
court found him guilty and he was sentenced to the maximum punishment imposed on the 
charges. However, he appealed the decision on the ground that the Marijuana Tax Act denied 
him due process of law by compelling him to give evidence to prove his innocence thereby 
infringing his right to remain silent before the court.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of United 
States of America reconsidered the matter. Harlan J286 held that the impugned presumption 
was an "irrational" and "arbitrary" denial of due process of law and hence unconstitutional.  
 
3.8 Conclusion  
 
From the discussion above, it is apparent that there is a major difference between a reverse 
burden of proof and an evidentiary burden in criminal matters. As a result, the two must not 
be confused or used interchangeably. A reverse burden of proof refers to a shift in the burden 
of proof from the state proving its case to an accused person disproving the state’s case. On 
the other hand, an evidentiary burden refers to the duty placed on the accused to produce 
sufficient ‘prima facie’ evidence before the court to enable it to call the plaintiff to answer. 
Another difference between a reverse burden of proof and an evidentiary burden can be 
construed by looking at the language in which a presumption is cast. The words “shall be 
                                                            
285 Leary v United States 1969 395 (6). 
286 Leary v United States 1969 395 (6) at 36. 
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presumed unless the contrary is proved”, indicates that a reverse burden of proof has been 
created whilst the words “is prima facie evidence” indicates that only an evidentiary burden 
of proof has been created by the impugned presumption.287 
 
 The practical implication of a reverse burden of proof is that the accused person is required 
to prove or disprove one element of the offence which shows that he is not guilty of that 
offence.288  This creates a possibility that the accused could be found guilty of a crime, 
despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt. Thus, South African courts 
have regarded a reverse burden of proof provision as unconstitutional on the basis that it 
infringes upon the accused’s right to a fair trial and particularly the right to be presumed 
innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings.  Unlike reverse burden of 
proof, an evidentiary burden does not create the possibility of conviction, despite the 
existence of a reasonable doubt. Ashworth289 contends, however, that “discharging the 
evidential burden does place an obligation on the defendant, and for that reason it requires 
justification and should not be casually imposed. But it is much lighter than the burden of 
proving an issue on the balance of probabilities, and hence it is less objectionable, certainly 
as a means of dealing with offences to which various possible defences may be raised and 
where it would clearly be inappropriate to expect the prosecution to negative all of them if the 
defendant did not wish to rely on some of them.” South African courts have regarded 
statutory presumptions that impose an evidentiary burden on the accused person to be 
constitutional. 
 
The South African courts290, like their Canadian, United Kingdom and United States of 
America291 counterparts, have regarded statutory presumptions that impose an evidentiary 
burden on the accused person to be constitutional because they do not create the possibility of 
conviction, despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. O’Regan J292 held that “the words 
“shall be prima facie evidence” used in section 6(3) of the Gambling Act 51 of 1965 were 
                                                            
287 Schwikkard, PJ. and Van der Merwe, SE. (2009) Principles of Evidence (3 ed) at 502 submit that where it is 
stated that evidence of fact constitutes ‘prima facie proof of’, or ‘prima facie evidence of’, then only an 
evidentiary burden is created. 
288  Dennis,I. (2005). 'Reverse Onuses and the Presumption of Innocence: In Search of Principle', Criminal Law 
Review 901-936, at 901. 
289 Ashworth, A. (2006) ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ 123 SALJ 63 at 89. 
290 S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) and S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC). 
291 For example, in Tot v United States 1943 319 All ER 463 and  Leary v United States 1969 395 ( 6). 
292 In Scagell v AG Western Cape 1996 (11) BCLR 1543 (CC), at paragraph 11. 
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generally considered as imposing no more than an evidentiary burden on the accused. Such 
an evidentiary burden merely requires “evidence sufficient to give rise to a reasonable doubt 
to prevent conviction”.1It was held further by the court that, unlike the imposition of a legal 
burden, an evidentiary burden did not create the possibility of conviction despite the 
existence of a reasonable doubt.”  With regard to the constitutionality of the reverse burden of 
proof, South African courts, like their Canadian counterparts, have considered reverse onus 
clauses (presumptions of guilt) as unconstitutional unless they are saved by the limitation 
clause293 on the basis that they require the accused person to prove or disprove one element of 
the offence. This creates a possibility that the accused person could be found guilty of crime 
despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt, thereby infringing upon the 
accused’s right to fair trial and particularly the right to be presumed innocent, to remain 
silent, and not to testify during the proceedings. 
 
While the Canadian courts have considered reverse onus clauses (presumptions of guilt) as 
being unconstitutional, they appear to have adopted the same approach employed by the 
courts in the United Kingdom and United States of America that reverse onus provisions can 
be justified if it is in the interest of furthering a legitimate aim. In essence, a reverse onus 
provision which infringes the accused's right to be presumed innocent and the right to remain 
silent can be held to be constitutional on the basis that is serves a legitimate purpose or on the 
basis that there is a reasonable connection between the facts proved and the fact presumed by 
the impugned provision.294  In South Africa this approach was rejected by O’ Reagan J in S v 
Bhulwana and S v Gwadiso295 in which it was held that section 21(1)(a)(i) of the Drug 
Trafficking Act,296 which provides that any person in possession of dagga exceeding 115 
grams shall be presumed to be dealing in such substance until the contrary is proved, to be  
unconstitutional on the basis that in infringed the accused’s right to be presumed innocent 
regardless of the fact that this provision was intended to serve a legitimate purpose of 
preventing drug trafficking crimes. The next chapter will consider whether the practical 
application of the presumption of guilt created by section 235(2) of the Act constitutes a 
                                                            
293 Section 36 of the Constitution.  
294 In R v Laba [1994] 3 (S.C.R.) 965 the Canadian Supreme Court has rejected reverse onus clauses as being 
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence when they are not rationally connected with or proportionate to 
the law's objective. 
295 S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC).  
296 Act 140 of 1992. 
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reverse onus of proof provision or an evidentiary burden as well its constitutionality in the 
South African law. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE APPLICATION AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESUMPTION OF 
GUILT CREATED BY SECTION 235 (2) OF THE ACT 
 
  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will explore the practical application of the presumption of guilt created by 
section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act. The chapter will also analyse and discuss 
whether or not the practical application of the presumption of guilt created by section 235(2) 
of the Tax Administration Act  will pass constitutional scrutiny, if tested against the 
taxpayer’s constitutional right to a fair trial enshrined by section 35 of the Constitution, 
particularly the right to be presumed innocent and the right to remain silent. Whether the 
presumption of guilt created by section 235(2) of the Tax Administrative Act297 constitutes a 
reverse burden of proof or an evidentiary burden is important for taxpayers seeking to 
challenge the constitutionality of this provision. This chapter will adopt a comparative 
approach in determining whether or not the practical application of this presumption will pass 
constitutional scrutiny. 
 
4.2 Application of the section 235(2) presumption 
 
Section 235 falls within Chapter 17 of the Tax Administration Act, which has the heading: 
“Criminal Offences”.  Section 235 of the Act298 provides that: 
 
(1) A person who with intent to evade or to assist another person to evade tax or to obtain 
an undue refund under a tax Act— 
 
(a)  makes or causes or allows to be made any false statement or entry in a return or 
other document, or signs a statement, return or other document so submitted 
without reasonable grounds for believing the same to be true; 
                                                            
297Act 28 of 2011. 
298 Act 28 of 2011. 
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(b) gives a false answer, whether orally or in writing, to a request for information 
made under this Act; 
(c)  prepares, maintains or authorises the preparation or maintenance of false books 
of account or other records or falsifies or authorises the falsification of books of 
account or other records; 
(d)  makes use of, or authorises the use of, fraud or contrivance; or 
(e)  makes any false statement for the purposes of obtaining any refund of or 
exemption from tax, 
is guilty of an offence and, upon conviction, is subject to a fine or to imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding five years. 
 
(2) Any person who makes a statement in the manner referred to in subsection (1) must, 
unless the person proves that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she was ignorant 
of the falsity of the statement and that the ignorance was not due to negligence on his or 
her part, be regarded as guilty of the offence referred to subsection (1). 
 
There are a few general observations that may be made in respect of the application to the 
accused taxpayer of the provisions of section 235. Firstly, “intention to evade” assessment or 
taxation on the part of the taxpayer is required to be present before he or she can be 
criminally charged for an offence as listed in sub-section (1). Secondly, the taxpayer who has 
been found guilty of an offence under section 235(1) of the Act,299 upon conviction, is subject 
to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years. A third general observation 
is that, if the SARS can prove that a false statement or entry is made in the return submitted 
by the taxpayer, until the contrary is proved, the taxpayer  is presumed to have made the false 
statement or entry with the intention to evade assessment or taxation. The onus to rebut this 
presumption of guilt is on the accused taxpayer to prove that that the statement or entry made 
is not false. In essence, it does not matter whether or not the false statement or entry by the 
taxpayer has been made innocently or in utmost good faith.300 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
299 Act 28 of 2011. 
300 Section 235(2) of the Act 28 of 2011. 
68 
 
4.3 Prerequisites for the application 
 
It is crucial to point out that the Act301 does not prescribe prerequisites for the application of 
the section 235(2) presumption. As far as can be ascertained, there are also no judicial 
decisions relating to the prerequisites for the application of the section 235(2) presumption. 
However, Goldswain302 submitted that there are two fundamental prerequisites which must be 
present for the application of the section 235(2) presumption. These prerequisites are as 
follows:  
  
(a) The jurisdictional facts that bring the taxpayer within the ambit of the Act or the relevant 
provision must first be proved by evidence provided by the SARS. It is only when the 
SARS prove the jurisdictional facts that bring the taxpayer within the ambit of the Act 
will the presumption of guilt created by section 235(2) of the Act303 become applicable. 
As articulated by the court in Mpande Foodliner CC v C: SARS,304 this prerequisite 
prevents the arbitrary exercise of power by the SARS. 
 
(b) The presumption of guilt created by section 235(2) of the Act305 only applies to matters 
contained in the letter of assessment issued by the Commissioner. It does not apply to any 
other matter not contained in the letter of assessment. 
 
According to Goldswain,306 the wording of presumption of guilt created by section 235(2) of 
the Act307 appears to indicate a further prerequisite. The SARS must first prove that a false 
statement or entry is made in a return before the presumption of intention to evade 
assessment or taxation becomes applicable. 
 
 
                                                            
301 Act 28 of 2011. 
302 G.K. Goldswain, (2009) "The application and constitutionality of the so called “reverse” onus of proof 
provisions and presumptions in the Income Tax Act: the revenue’s unfair advantage", Meditari Accountancy 
Research, Vol. 17 Iss: 2, pp.61 - 83 
303 Act 28 of 2011. 
304 Mpande Foodliner CC v C:SARS and Others (63 SATC 46) 
305 Act 28 of 2011. 
306 G.K. Goldswain, (2009) "The application and constitutionality of the so called “reverse” onus of proof 
provisions and presumptions in the Income Tax Act: the revenue’s unfair advantage", Meditari Accountancy 
Research, Vol. 17 at 61 – 83. 
307 Act 28 of 2011. 
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4.4 Constitutional issues arising from the presumption created by section 235(2) 
 
The formulation of the presumption created by section 235(2) of the Act308 has an effect on 
the burden of proof. It is apparent that this provision creates a presumption that requires proof 
of a basic fact. The basic fact that needs to be proved by the state is that a false statement or 
entry has been made in the return submitted by the taxpayer. Once this basic fact has been 
proved, the presumption is triggered in the criminal proceedings against the accused taxpayer. 
This raises a question as to whether or not the presumption created by section 235(2) 
unreasonably infringes the constitutional rights of the accused taxpayer to a fair trial as 
guaranteed to an accused person in section 35(3) of the Constitution, in particular the right, 
mentioned in section 35(3)(h), to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify 
during the proceedings. 
 
4.5 The Constitutionality of the section 235(2) presumption 
 
It is of paramount significance to point out that there are no decided cases that have decided 
the matter involving a constitutional challenge of the presumption of guilt created by section 
235(2) of the Act.309  The conclusion on this matter in as far as this thesis is concerned, will 
be based on a comparative approach. In essence, the court decisions on provisions which 
have similar effect on the taxpayer as the presumption of guilt created by section 235(2) of 
the Act310 will play a significant role in reaching a conclusion in this thesis. 
 
In terms of section 235(2) of the Act,311 if the SARS can prove that a false statement or entry 
is made in the return submitted by the taxpayer, until the contrary is proved, the taxpayer is 
presumed to have made the false statement or entry with the intent to evade assessment or 
taxation. The practical implication of this presumption is to relieve the SARS of the burden of 
proving that the accused made a false statement or entry in a return with the necessary 
intention. As a result of this, the SARS can easily secure a conviction against the accused 
taxpayer. At the heart of this thesis is the question whether or not the presumption of guilt 
                                                            
308Act 28 of 2011. 
309 Act 28 of 2011. 
310 Act 28 of 2011. 
311 Act 28 of 2011. 
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created by section 235(2) of the Act312 will pass constitutional scrutiny if tested against the 
constitutional provisions of section 35(3) of the Constitution, in particular the right, 
mentioned in section 35(3)(h), to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify 
during the proceedings.  
 
According to Hoffmann and Zeffertt,313 the difference between a reverse burden of proof and 
an evidentiary burden in a criminal matter can be construed by looking at the language in 
which a presumption is cast. The words “shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved”, 
indicates that a reverse burden of proof has been created314 whilst the words “is prima facie 
evidence” indicates that only an evidentiary burden of proof has been created by the 
impugned presumption.315 In terms of section 235(2) of the Act,316 where a taxpayer makes a 
false statement in any books of account or other records of any taxpayer, “unless the person 
proves” that there is a reasonable possibility that he was ignorant of the falsity of the 
statement and that the ignorance was not due to negligence on his part, he shall be regarded 
as guilty of making a false statement with the intention of evading assessment or taxation. On 
the basis of the submission by Hoffmann and Zeffertt,317 it can be concluded that section 
235(2) of the Act318 creates a reverse burden of proof rather than an evidentiary burden.  
 
The constitutional implications of the above conclusion is that section 235(2) of the Act319 
will be considered unconstitutional because it creates a possibility that the accused taxpayer 
could be found guilty of a crime, despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or her 
guilt, thereby infringing the taxpayer’s a right to fair trial, particularly the right to be 
presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings. However, 
section 235(2) of the Act320 can still be found to be constitutional if the constitutional court 
                                                            
312 Act 28 of 2011.  
313 Hoffmann, L.H. &Zeffertt, D.T. (1988) The South African Law of Evidence 4 ed at 534.  
314Schwikkard, PJ. and Van der Merwe, SE. (2009) Principles of Evidence (3 ed) at 502 submit that where it is 
stated that evidence of fact constitutes ‘prima facie proof of’, or ‘prima facie evidence of’, then only an 
evidentiary burden is created. 
315 Schwikkard, PJ. and Van der Merwe, SE. (2009) Principles of Evidence (3 ed) at 502 submit that where it is 
stated that evidence of fact constitutes ‘prima facie proof of’, or ‘prima facie evidence of’, then only an 
evidentiary burden is created. 
316 Act 28 of 2011. 
317 Hoffmann, L.H. & Zeffertt, D.T. (1988) The South African Law of Evidence 4 ed at 534.  
318 Act 28 of 2011. 
319 Act 28 of 2011. 
320 Act 28 of 2011.  
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holds the view that the infringement caused by this provision is reasonable and justifiable 
under the limitation clause in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.    
SARS321 attempted to justify the constitutionality of the presumption of guilt created by 
section 235(2) of the Act322  by stating that: 
 
This does not result in a so-called “reverse onus”, but only places on the 
accused an evidentiary burden in relation to statements made by him. If 
discharged the onus would remain on the state to prove beyond reasonable 
doubt knowledge of, or negligence in relation to, the falsity of the 
statement. While it may limit the fundamental right to silence, it does so 
only in relation to facts which are peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
accused and in respect of which it would not be unreasonable to require the 
accused to discharge an evidentiary burden. 
 
It is important to emphasise that although the wording of the presumption created by section 
235(2) of the Act323 constitutes a reverse burden of proof according to the Hoffmann and 
Zeffertt324 test, it is possible that this presumption can constitute an evidential burden (as 
submitted by SARS325) in its practical application. Provided that section 235(2) of the Act326 
constitutes an evidential burden in its practical application, it does not does not create the 
possibility of conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. If section 235(2) creates 
only an evidential burden in its practical application, the South African courts327 just like 
their Canadian,328 United Kingdom and United State of America329 counterparts will consider 
such statutory presumption to be constitutional.  
 
It must be emphasised that the wording of the presumption of guilt created by section 235(2) 
of the Act330 corresponds closely to the presumption of guilt created by section 104(2) of the 
                                                            
321 Short Guide to the Tax Administration Act 13 of 2012 para 17.3.  
322 Act 28 of 2011. 
323 Act 28 of 2011. 
324 Hoffmann, L.H. &Zeffertt, D.T. (1988) The South African Law of Evidence 4 ed at 534.  
325 Short Guide to the Tax Administration Act 13 of 2012 para 17.3. 
326 Act 28 of 2011. 
327 S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) and S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC). 
328 R v Oakes 1986 26 DLR 4th 200.   
329 Tot v United States 1943 319 All ER 463.  
330 Act 28 of 2011. 
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Income Tax Act331 and section 102(4) of the Customs and Excise Act.332 It is imperative to 
consider how South African courts have dealt with these presumptions in considering their 
constitutionality. 
 
4.6 The presumption of guilt created by section 104(2) of the Income Tax Act 
 
Section 104(2) of the Income Tax Act333, (which has since been deleted from the Act and 
replaced by section 235 of the Tax Administration Act) provided that, where a taxpayer or 
any other person makes a false statement or entry in any books of account or other records of 
any taxpayer, until the contrary is proved, the taxpayer or other person is presumed to have 
made such a false statement or entry with the intention of evading assessment or taxation.  
 
In 1994, the Katz Commission Report334 recognised that the presumption created by section 
104(2) of the Income Tax Act relieves the state from its legal burden of  proving an essential 
element of the offence committed beyond reasonable doubt, namely that it was committed 
with intent to evade assessment or taxation. The same view has been expressed by Van 
Schalkwyk335 who submitted that the implication of section 104(2) of the Income Tax Act is 
to create a reverse onus of proof which relieves the state from proving the existence of the 
intention to evade taxation on the part of the accused taxpayer. By casting the onus of proof 
on the taxpayer to prove the contrary, the Katz Commission Report336 submitted that the 
section 104(2) presumption violates the constitutional right of the accused taxpayer to be 
presumed innocent and not to testify during a criminal trial. Consequently, the Report337 
concluded that the general right to a fair trial is denied by the existence of the presumption 
created by section 104(2) of the Income Tax Act and hence the section 104(2) should be 
amended to be compatible with the Constitution. 
 
The  Katz Commission Report338 went further to consider whether or not the infringement 
caused by section 104(2) of the Income Tax Act of the constitutional right of an accused 
                                                            
331 The Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
332 The Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964.  
333 Act 58 of 1962. 
334 The Commission of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa 1994 at77-78. 
335 Van Schalkwyk, L. (1996). The constitutionality of the reversed onus of proof. Accountancy SA 25. 
336 The Commission of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa 1994 at77-78. 
337 The Commission of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa 1994 at77-78. 
338 The Commission of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa 1994 at77-78. 
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taxpayer to be presumed innocent and the right not to testify during trial can be justified in 
terms of section 33(1) of the Interim Constitution.339 In dealing with this question, the report 
considered the Canadian case of R v Oakes340 in which Dickson CJC341 stated that: 
 
An excuse or a defence should not affect the analysis of the presumption of 
innocence. It is the final effect of a provision on the verdict that is decisive. 
If an accused is required to prove some fact on the balance of probabilities 
to avoid conviction, the provision violates the presumption of innocence 
because it permits a conviction in spite of considerable doubt in the mind of 
the trier of fact as to the guilt of the accused.  
  
On the basis of this dictum, the report submitted that the accused taxpayer may fail to 
discharge the onus on a balance of probabilities that he did not intend to make a false 
statement and thereby be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. In light of 
this, the report held that that the infringement caused by section 104(2) of the Income Tax 
Act of the constitutional right of an accused taxpayer to be presumed innocent and the right 
not to testify during trial cannot be justified. Subsequently, the report concluded that the 
section 104(2) of the Income Tax Act was unconstitutional. 
 
4.7 The presumption created by section 102(4) of the Customs and Excise Act 
 
The existence of the constitution has led to the diminishing of reverse onus provisions in 
South African law. However, there is a growing concern relating to the continued existence 
of some reverse onus provisions or ‘presumptions of guilt’ in various tax statutes. One of 
these reverse onus provisions is found in section 102(4) of the Customs and Excise Act.  
Section 102(4) of the Act provides that: 
 
In  any dispute in which the state, the Minister or the Commissioner or any 
officer is a party, the question arises whether the proper duty has been paid 
or whether any goods or plant have been lawfully used, imported, exported, 
manufactured, removed or otherwise dealt with or in, or whether any books, 
                                                            
339 Replaced with a similar limitation of rights clause, section 36, in the Constitution. 
340 R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200(SCC). 
341 R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200(SCC) at 223. 
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accounts, documents, forms or invoices required by rule to be completed 
and kept, exist or have been duly completed and kept or have been 
furnished to any officer, it shall be presumed that such duty has not been 
paid or that such goods or plant have not been lawfully used, imported, 
exported, manufactured, removed or otherwise dealt with or in, or that such 
books, accounts, documents, forms or invoices do not exist or have not 
been duly completed and kept or have not been so furnished, as the case 
may be. 
 
The above provision does not contain the words “is prima facie evidence” which indicates 
that only an evidentiary burden of proof has been created by the impugned presumption.342 
According to the Hoffmann and Zeffertt343 test, it is apparent that a conclusion that can be 
drawn in this regard is that section 102(4) of the Act creates a reverse burden of proof rather 
than an evidentiary burden.  However, in AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the 
Republic of South Africa (Department of Customs & Excise) & another344, the court was not 
concerned with the wording of the presumption created by section 102(4) of the Act but with 
the practical effect of the presumption upon the taxpayer. The facts of the case were as 
follows: AMI was a subsidiary of a Belgian company and conducted business as a clearing 
and forwarding agent in relation to goods imported and exported to and from South Africa.  
During October 2000, SARS issued a letter of demand to AMI in the amount of R331 352.84 
in relation to three bills of entry which it claimed were falsely acquired. In particular, SARS 
claimed that the stamps on the bills of entry did not conform with the stamps that were 
currently used by border officials.345 However, the AMI could not locate the acquired 
documents years later because it had merged with another company and its old premises had 
been changed and documents were lost. More so, the AMI had ceased trading in South Africa 
and documents had been destroyed.346 In March 2003 AMI instituted action for an order 
                                                            
342 Schwikkard, PJ. and Van der Merwe, SE. (2009) Principles of Evidence (3 ed) at 502 submit that where it is 
stated that evidence of fact constitutes ‘ ‘prima facie evidence of’, then only an evidentiary burden is created. 
343 Hoffmann, L.H. &Zeffertt, D.T. (1988) The South African Law of Evidence 4 ed at 534.  
344 AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa (Department of Customs & Excise) 
& another 2010 ZASCA 62. 
345 AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa & another 2010 ZASCA 62 
paragraph 7. 
346 AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa & another 2010 ZASCA 62 
paragraph 8. 
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declaring that it was not liable to pay SARS any of the customs duties demanded.347 These 
were in respect of the allegedly falsified documents. SARS argued that due to the provisions 
of section 102(4) of the Customs Act, it was AMI that bore the onus of proving that the 
stamps were genuine, notwithstanding the fact that SARS had raised an allegation of fraud.348 
On the other hand, AMI argued that the ‘reverse onus’ imposed on it by section 102(4) of the 
Customs Act was unconstitutional because it infringes its right to be presumed innocent and 
not to testify during a criminal trial. Hassim AJ349 in the KwaZulu-Natal High Court rejected 
this argument finding that AMI had not proved that the stamps were genuine. AMI was given 
leave to appeal. 
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) was faced with the question of whether the 
reverse onus provision contained in section 102(4) of the Customs Act extended to an 
allegation of fraud made by SARS. The first submission by SARS was that by virtue of 
section 102(4), AMI bore the onus of proving that the stamps were genuine. In deciding this 
matter, the SCA considered judgment of the court in Standard Bank v Du Plooy & another; 
Standard Bank v Coetzee & another350 and Courtney Clarke v Bassingthwaighte351 in which 
it was succinctly expressed that the party who alleges fraud must plead and prove it. Using 
the judgment of the court in Standard Bank v Du Plooy352 and Courtney353 as precedent on 
this legal question, the SCA held that: 
 
 I can see no reason why the onus of proving fraud should shift from SARS 
to AMI simply because s 102(4) creates an assumption of liability that AMI 
must disprove. Once AMI has proved acquittal the usual rule must apply: 
the fraud must be proved by the party making the allegation – SARS. 
 
Consequently, the court held that since AMI successfully proved that it had removed the 
goods in bond as required by the Customs Act, the onus created by section 102(4) had been 
                                                            
347 AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa & another 2010 ZASCA 62 at  
paragraph 7. 
348 AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa & another 2010 ZASCA 62 at 
paragraph 8. 
349 AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa & another 2010 ZASCA 62 at 
paragraph 7. 
350 Standard Bankv Du Plooy & another; Standard Bank v Coetzee & another 1999 16 SC 161 at 166. 
351 Courtney Clarke v Bassingthwaighte 1991 (1) SA 684 (Nm) at 689F-G. 
352 Standard Bankv Du Plooy & another; Standard Bank v Coetzee & another 1999 16 SC 161 at 166. 
353 Courtney Clarke v Bassingthwaighte 1991 (1) SA 684 (Nm) at 689F-G. 
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discharged. Once the AMI successfully discharged this onus, the onus shifts to SARS, as the 
party alleging fraud, to provide evidence that the bills of entry had been falsified. There was 
no acceptable evidence adduced by SARS, either documentary or through the witnesses, that 
the stamps on the four bills of entry had been falsified. Accordingly, the court held that SARS 
could not claim duties in respect of those bills. 
 
The importance of this judgment in the South African law of taxation is that it establishes an 
important precedent that the reverse onus provision should not be afforded an open ended 
interpretation. Having been delivered by the Supreme Court of Appeal, the judgment of the 
court in AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa 
(Department of Customs & Excise) & another354 establishes an important precedent that 
binds all lower courts and its own future decisions. The reverse onus in section 235(2) of the 
Act355 is very similar to section 102(4) of the Customs Act. Given the similarity of the onus 
provisions and their effect on the taxpayer, there does not seem to be any reason why the 
principle laid down in AMI should not be applicable to 235(2) of the Act.356 Giving a narrow 
rather than an open-ended interpretation to the presumption created by section 235(2) of the 
Tax Administration Act, it can be submitted that it only places the burden of proof on the 
taxpayer to show that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she was ignorant of the 
falsity of the statement and that the ignorance was not due to negligence on his or her part. 
Therefore, once the taxpayer has discharged the burden of proving that there is a reasonable 
possibility that he or she was ignorant of the falsity of the statement and that the ignorance 
was not due to negligence on his or her part, and SARS raises the issue of fraud, it is SARS 
which bears the onus of proving such fraud, notwithstanding the provisions of section 235(2) 
of the Act.357 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
354 AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa (Department of Customs & Excise) 
& another 2010 ZASCA 62. 
355 Act 28 of 2011. 
356 Act 28 of 2011. 
357 Act 28 of 2011. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
 
Section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act358 provides that where a taxpayer or any other 
person makes a false statement in any books of account or other records of any taxpayer, 
unless the person proves that there is a reasonable possibility that he was ignorant of the 
falsity of the statement and that the ignorance was not due to negligence on his part, he shall 
be regarded as guilty of making a false statement with the intention of evading assessment or 
taxation.  The implication of this presumption is that the state is relieved from its legal burden 
of proving beyond reasonable doubt an essential element of the offence committed, namely 
that it was committed with intent to evade assessment or taxation. It is submitted that, if this 
presumption is applied by courts in its grammatically strict sense, the accused taxpayer bears 
the onus to prove that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she was ignorant of the 
falsity of the statement and that the ignorance was not due to negligence on his or her part. In 
this regard, section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act359 will be regarded as judicial and 
penal in nature, thus violating the accused taxpayer’s constitutional right to be presumed 
innocent and the right not to testify during trial. In this legal sense, there is little legal doubt 
that the general right to a fair trial is denied by the existence of the presumption created by 
section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act.360 Therefore, section 235(2) of the Tax 
Administration Act will be unconstitutional and should be declared invalid or amended so 
that it can be compatible with the Constitutional right to a fair trial. 
 
However, if a narrow approach can be given to the interpretation of the presumption created 
by section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act,361 a different conclusion can be reached. 
The court in AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa 
(Department of Customs & Excise) & another362 expressly stated that the party who alleges 
and pleads fraud must prove it. The   court went on to state that the assumption of liability 
created by section 102(4)  of the Customs Act (which is similar to section 235(2) of the Tax 
Administration Act both in its wording and effect upon the taxpayer) did not shift the onus of 
proving the existence of fraud from SARS onto the taxpayer. The court held that the accused 
taxpayer had to prove that it had removed the goods in bond as required by the Customs Act, 
                                                            
358Act 28 of 2011. 
359Act 28 of 2011. 
360Act 28 of 2011. 
361Act 28 of 2011. 
362 AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa (Department of Customs & Excise) 
& another 2010 ZASCA 62. 
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by doing so the onus created by section 102(4) of the Customs Act will be discharged. Once 
AMI had achieved this, it was up to SARS, as the party alleging fraud, to provide evidence 
that the bills of entry had been falsified. The importance of this judgment in the South 
African law of taxation is that it establishes an important precedent that the reverse onus 
provision should not be afforded an open ended interpretation. Giving a narrow interpretation 
to the presumption created by section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act, it can be 
submitted that this provision only places the burden of proof on the taxpayer to show that 
there is a reasonable possibility that he or she was ignorant of the falsity of the statement and 
that the ignorance was not due to negligence on his or her part. Once the taxpayer has 
discharged the burden of proving that there is a reasonable possibility that he was ignorant of 
the falsity of the statement and that the ignorance was not due to negligence on his part, and 
SARS raises the issue of fraud, it is the SARS which bears the onus of proving such fraud.  In 
practice, the application of section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act363 will therefore 
constitute an evidentiary burden rather than a reverse onus. In this regard, the presumption 
created by section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act364 will not create the possibility of 
conviction, despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it does not violate the 
accused taxpayer’s the right to a fair trial and the right to be presumed innocent and hence it 
is constitutional. 
 
The following chapter will provide a conclusion on whether or not the practical application of 
the presumption of guilt created by section 235(2) of the Act will pass constitutional scrutiny, 
if tested against the taxpayer’s constitutional right to a fair trial enshrined by section 35 of the 
Constitution, particularly the right to be presumed innocent and the right to remain silent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
363Act 28 of 2011. 
364Act 28 of 2011. 
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CHAPTER 5- CONCLUSION  
 
 
5.1 Goals of the research 
 
The research was aimed at examining the legal nature of the presumption of guilt created by 
section 235(2) of the Tax Admiration Act365 and to establish whether or not its practical 
application violates the taxpayer’s fundamental right contained in section 35(3) of the 
Constitution, which gives every accused taxpayer the right to a fair trial, including the right to 
be presumed innocent.366 Allied to this aim was the goal to provide clarity on the 
constitutionality of this presumption because it has been widely been criticised for 
unjustifiably violating the taxpayer's constitutional right to a fair trial. The research was also 
intended to shed light on the chances of the taxpayer to succeed in challenging the 
constitutionality of section 235(2) of the Act367 if he or she so wishes. 
 
The right to fair trial was not constitutionally entrenched in the South African law until 
1994368 when the Interim Constitution369 came into force. The right to a fair trial was 
therefore embodied in section 25(3) of the Interim Constitution.370 The purpose of section 
25(3) of the Interim Constitution371 was expressed by the court in S v Nombewu372 in which 
Jones J373 stated that “the purpose of section 25(3) of the Interim Constitution374 was to 
'reinforce and preserve the presumption of innocence, the right to silence, the right of an 
accused not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, and his right not to be compelled 
to make a confession or admission which could be used in evidence against him’”. In light of 
this judgment, it is a common cause that the section 25(3) of the Interim Constitution375 was 
the first step towards affording all accused persons a constitutional right to a fair trial.  
                                                            
365Act 28 of 2011. 
366Van Schalkwyk, L. (1996). The constitutionality of the reversed onus of proof. Accountancy SA 25. 
367Act 28 of 2011. 
368Skeen, A. (2000). The Right to a Fair Trial in the South African Law 110. 
369 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.  
370The Interim Constitution was temporary measure whist the new Constitution was being drafted. 
371The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
372S v Nombewu, 1996 (2) SACR 396 (E).  
373 S v Nombewu, 1996 (2) SACR 396 (E) at 403. 
374The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
375The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.  
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The new Constitution376 was adopted in 1996.The advent of the Constitution brought a major 
shift in the legal policies of the country.377 One of the major significant features of the advent 
of the 1996 Constitution is that the scope and ambit of the right to a fair trial was further 
entrenched and broadened.378 The Constitution became the supreme law379 of the country and 
any law or conduct which is inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it 
must be fulfilled.380 The implication of the supremacy of the Constitution means that all 
legislation, including fiscal statutes such as the Tax Administration Act381, must be tested 
against the provisions of the Constitution. In essence, the Constitutional Court has been 
empowered to declare any statute, including a fiscal statute, invalid if such statute is found to 
be inconsistent with the Constitution.  The principle of “supremacy of the constitution” 
indicates that legislation should primarily abide by the principles set out in the Constitution. 
Any legislative provision in conflict with the Constitution may be declared unconstitutional, 
in which case such provision will be of no force and effect. Section 172 (1) of the 
Constitution provides that: 
 
1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court — 
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid 
to the extent of its inconsistency; and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including — 
(i)  an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any 
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect. 
 
 
In support of this submission, the Katz Commission382 stated that: 
 
The tax system is subject to the Constitution and must conform to society’s commitment 
to the Rule of Law. This means not only that the system should be effective in the 
                                                            
376 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
377 Croome, B.J. (2002) “Constitutional Law and Taxpayer’s Rights in South Africa – An Overview” (Acta 
Juridica 1 at 2. 
378Steytler, N. (1998) Constitutional Criminal Procedure at 215. 
379 Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the Constitution is that it is the supreme law of our country and 
that any law or conduct which is inconsistent with it is invalid.  
380South African Police Service v Public Servants Association 2007(3) SA521 (CC) at 25.  
381Act 28 of 2011. 
382 The Commission of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa 1994 at77-78. 
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enforcement of all tax laws, equally and irrespective of status but also that citizens’ right 
to be taxed strictly in accordance with the terms of those laws should be scrupulously 
protected both in the design of those laws and in their implementation. 
 
Section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act383 provides that where a taxpayer or any other 
person makes a false statement in any books of account or other records of any taxpayer, 
“unless the person proves that there is a reasonable possibility that he was ignorant of the 
falsity of the statement and that the ignorance was not due to negligence on his part, he shall 
be regarded as guilty” of making a false statement with the intention of evading assessment 
or taxation. The implication of this presumption is that it creates a reverse onus provision 
which requires the accused taxpayer to bear the onus of proof to prove that there is a 
reasonable possibility that he or she was ignorant of the falsity of the statement and that the 
ignorance was not due to negligence on his or her part. 
 
This thesis presented a brief comparative study of the constitutionality of the reverse burden 
of proof and evidentiary burden in other jurisdictions like Canada, the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom. It has been observed that South African courts384 just like 
their Canadian,385 United Kingdom and United State of America386 counterparts, have 
regarded statutory presumptions that impose an evidentiary burden on the accused person to 
be constitutional because they do not create the possibility of conviction, despite the 
existence of a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, South African courts like their Canadian 
                                                            
383Section 235(2) of the Act383 provides that: 
(1) A person who with intent to evade or to assist another person to evade tax or to obtain an undue refund 
under a tax Act— 
(a) makes or causes or allows to be made any false statement or entry in a return or other document, 
or signs a statement, return or other document so submitted without reasonable grounds for believing 
the same to be true; 
(b) gives a false answer, orally or in writing, to a request for information made under this Act; 
(c) prepares, maintains or authorises the preparation or maintenance of false books of account or other 
records or falsifies or authorises the falsification of books of account or other records; 
(d) makes use of, or authorises the use of, fraud or contrivance; or 
(e) makes any false statement for the purposes of obtaining any refund of or exemption from tax, is 
guilty of an offence and, upon conviction, is subject to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding five years. 
(2) Any person who makes a statement in the manner referred to in subsection (1) must, unless the person 
proves that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she was ignorant of the falsity of the statement and that 
the ignorance was not due to negligence on his or her part, be regarded as guilty of the offence referred to 
subsection (1). 
 
384 S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) and S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC). 
385 R v Oakes 1986 26 DLR 4th 200.   
386 Tot v United States 1943 319 All ER 463.  
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counterparts have considered reverse onus clauses as being unconstitutional (unless they are 
saved by the limitation clause) on the basis that they require the accused person to prove or 
disprove one element of the offence thereby creating a possibility that the accused person 
could be found guilty of a crime, despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or her 
guilt. In the United Kingdom and United States of America, a reverse onus provision can be 
justified on the basis of proportionality and if it is in the interest of furthering a legitimate 
aim. In South Africa, this approach has been rejected by the court. 
 
In relation to casting the onus of proof on an accused taxpayer to prove that there is a 
reasonable possibility that he or she was ignorant of the falsity of the statement and that the 
ignorance was not due to negligence on his or her part, the Katz Commission Report387 
submitted that the reverse burden of proof provision relieves the state of its legal burden of 
proving beyond reasonable doubt an essential element of the offence committed, namely that 
it was committed with intent to evade assessment or taxation. In essence, if the presumption 
created by section 235(2) of the Act388  is applied by courts in its strict sense, it is common 
cause that it will be regarded as judicial and penal in nature, thus violating the accused 
taxpayer’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent and the right not to testify during 
trial. In this legal sense, there is little legal doubt that the general “right to a fair trial” is 
denied by the existence of the presumption created by section 235(2) of the Tax 
Administration Act.389 Therefore, section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act is 
unconstitutional and must be declared invalid or amended to be compatible with the 
Constitutional norm and values of a fair trial. 
 
Adopting a narrow approach to the interpretation of the presumption created by section 
235(2) of the Act,390 a different conclusion can be reached. The court in AMI Forwarding 
(Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa (Department of Customs & Excise) & 
another391 expressly stated that the party who alleges and pleads fraud must prove it. The   
court also stated that the assumption of liability created by section 102(4) of the Customs Act 
did not shift the onus of proving the existence of fraud from SARS onto the taxpayer. The 
court held that the accused taxpayer had to prove that it had removed the goods in bond as 
                                                            
387 The Commission of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa 1994 at77-78. 
388Act 28 of 2011. 
389Act 28 of 2011. 
390Act 28 of 2011. 
391 AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa (Department of Customs & Excise) 
& another 2010 ZASCA 62. 
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required by the Customs Act, by doing so the onus created by section 102(4) of the Customs 
Act will be discharged. Once AMI had achieved this, it was up to SARS, as the party alleging 
fraud, to provide evidence that the bills of entry had been falsified. The importance of this 
judgment in the South African law of taxation is that it establishes an important precedent 
that the reverse onus provision should not be afforded an open-ended interpretation. Giving a 
narrow interpretation to the presumption created by section 235(2) of the Tax Administration 
Act, it can be submitted that it only places the burden of proof on the taxpayer to show that 
there is a reasonable possibility that he or she was ignorant of the falsity of the statement and 
that the ignorance was not due to negligence on his or her part. Once the taxpayer has 
discharged the burden of proving that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she was 
ignorant of the falsity of the statement and that the ignorance was not due to negligence on 
his part, and SARS raises the issue of fraud, it is SARS which bears the onus of proving such 
fraud.  In practice, the application of section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act392 will 
constitute a mere evidentiary burden rather than a reverse onus in a strict constitutional sense. 
In this regard, it is submitted that the presumption created by section 235(2) of the Tax 
Administration Act393 does not create the possibility of conviction despite the existence of a 
reasonable doubt. Therefore, it does not violate the accused taxpayer’s the right to a fair trial 
and the right to be presumed innocent hence it is constitutional. 
 
5.2 Purpose of the Research 
 
Apart from providing clarity on the constitutionality of the presumption created by section 
235(2) of the Tax Administration Act, this research also sought to shed light on the chances 
of the taxpayer to succeed in challenging the constitutionality of section 235(2) of the Tax 
Administration Act if he/she so wishes. It is important to point out that the success of the 
taxpayer in challenging the presumption created by section 235(2) of the Act depends on the 
interpretation afforded to this provision by the court. If the court gives this provision an open 
ended interpretation to mean that it requires the accused taxpayer to prove absence of fraud 
after discharging the burden of proving a reasonable possibility that he was ignorant of the 
falsity of the statement and that the ignorance was not due to negligence on his part, then the 
provision will be unconstitutional. The accused taxpayer will succeed in this regard. 
However, based on the judgment of the SCA in AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of 
                                                            
392Act 28 of 2011. 
393Act 28 of 2011. 
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the Republic of South Africa (Department of Customs & Excise) & another394 which set an 
important precedent that the reverse onus provision should not be afforded an open ended 
interpretation, there does not seem to be any reason why the principle laid down in AMI 
should not be applicable to 235(2) of the Act395 given the similarity of section 235(2) of the 
Act396 to section 102(4) of the Customs Act and their effect on the  accused taxpayer. 
 
By affording a narrow interpretation to the presumption created by section 235(2) of the Tax 
Administration Act,397 it can be submitted that this provision only places the burden of proof 
on the taxpayer to show that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she was ignorant of 
the falsity of the statement and that the ignorance was not due to negligence on his or her 
part. Once the taxpayer has discharged the burden of proving that there is a reasonable 
possibility that he or she was ignorant of the falsity of the statement and that the ignorance 
was not due to negligence on his or her part, and SARS raises the issue of fraud, it is SARS 
which bears the onus of proving such fraud, notwithstanding the provisions of section 235(2) 
of the Act.398 In practice, the application of section 235(2) of the Act399 will constitute an 
evidentiary burden rather than a reverse onus. In other words, it does not create the possibility 
of conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it does not violate the 
accused taxpayer’s the right to a fair trial and the right to be presumed innocent and hence it 
is constitutional.  
 
The judgment of the court in in AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of 
South Africa (Department of Customs & Excise) & another400 has been handed down by the 
South African Court of Appeal. This means that this judgment forms an important precedent 
to all lower courts and courts on the same level regarding not affording an open ended 
interpretation to reverse onus provisions. Accordingly, the chances the accused taxpayer has 
to challenge the constitutionality of section 235(2) of the Act401 are slim.   
 
                                                            
394 AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa (Department of Customs & Excise) 
& another 2010 ZASCA 62. 
395 Act 28 of 2011. 
396 Act 28 of 2011. 
397 Act 28 of 2011. 
398 Act 28 of 2011. 
399Act 28 of 2011. 
400 AMI Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa (Department of Customs & Excise) 
& another 2010 ZASCA 62. 
401 Act 28 of 2011. 
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